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ABSTRACT
NATO ENLARGEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY
ÇATAL, ERDOĞAN
M.A. In International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali Karaosmanoğlu
July 2001, 125 pages
NATO, which has been throughout the Cold War a collective defense
organization, was considered either useless or out of date with the end of the Cold
War. However, as it did in the early years of the Cold War, habitually originating
from its own dynamics, NATO transformed itself in order to meet the imperatives of
the post-Cold War international environment. The geographical enlargement of
NATO is the centerpiece of this whole transformation process. It bears implications
not only for NATO itself but also for the foreign policy that Euro-Atlantic states
follow. The partnership and membership aspects of the geographical enlargement
preserved NATO's credibility and served NATO on its way to become a security
community, and both aspects ensured NATO's survival. As such, the establishment
of relations either through partnership, membership or other way with NATO
became the objective of CEE, Balkan, Caucasian, and Central Asian countries, on
their way to acquire a democratic, peaceful, and Western identity. In this context,
NATO addressed the concerns of a community of 46 states in the Euro-Atlantic
region. Meanwhile, on part of Turkey, there appeared some opportunities and
setbacks. While consolidating Turkey's western identity on the Caucasus, the
Balkans and Central Asia, NATO enlargement brought new concerns to Turkey's
agenda regarding regional security as well as Turkey's position in its only and most
institutional and functional linkage with the Western Europe and the U.S. After the
admission of three new members to NATO in 1999, the pros and cons of a second
round of NATO enlargement requires an examination in depth as the decision time
gets closer, not only for NATO but also for Turkey.
Keywords: NATO, alliance, security, identity, partnership, membership,
expansion, enlargement, Turkey, regional, Eurasia, Euro-Atlantic, institution,
organization, defence, zone, sphere, influence, interest
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ÖZET
NATO'NUN GENİŞLEMESİ VE TÜRKİYE ÜZERİNE ETKİLERİ
ÇATAL, ERDOĞAN
Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ali Karaosmanoğlu
Temmuz 2001, 125 Sayfa
Soğuk Savaş dönemi boyunca bir ortak savunma kuruluşu olan NATO, bu
dönemin sona ermesiyle gereksiz veya çağdışı olarak düşünülmüştür. Ancak, NATO,
Soğuk Savaşın ilk yıllarında olduğu gibi, 1990larda da, değişen uluslararası ortamın
gereklerini yerine getirmek maksadıyla alışılmış şekilde kendi iç dinamiklerinden
kaynaklanan bir değişim uygulamıştır. NATO'nun coğrafi genişlemesi, bir bütün
olan değişim sürecinin en merkezi parçasını teşkil etmektedir. Coğrafi genişleme
sürecinin hem NATO ve hem de Avrupa-Atlantik ülkelerinin izledikleri dış ve
güvenlik politikalarında önemli yeri olmuştur. Bu sürecin ortaklık ve üyelik kısımları
NATO'nun geçerliliği ve saygınlığını korumuş, NATO'ya bir güvenlik topluluğunun
tesisi yolunda yardım etmiş ve NATO'nun bekasını temin etmiştir. Aynı şekilde,
NATO ile ister üyelik, ister ortaklık, ve ister diyalog yoluyla ilişkiler tesis etmek,
Orta ve Doğu Avrupa'dan Orta Asya'ya kadar bütün ülkelerin demokratik, barışçı, ve
batılı bir kimlik kazanmak yolunda hedefleri olmuştur. Bu ortamda NATO, 46
ülkenin oluşturduğu Avrupa-Atlantik topluluğunun düşüncelerine hitap etmiştir. Bu
süreç Türkiye için de önemli fırsatlar ve sakıncalar yaratmıştır. NATO'nun
genişlemesi, bir yandan Türkiye'nin batılı kimliğini Balkanlar, Kafkaslar ve Orta
Asya'da perçinlerken, öte yandan Türkiye'nin Batı Avrupa ve Amerika ile tek ve en
kurumsal ve en fonksiyonel bağı olan NATO içindeki konumu ve bölgesel güvenlik
çıkarlarını doğrudan etkileyecek koşullar yaratmıştır. Bugün, 1999 yılında üç yeni
üyenin NATO'ya katılmasının ardından, ikinci bir genişleme sürecinin artı ve
eksilerinin derinlemesine incelenmesi, karar zamanı yaklaştıkça, hem NATO ve hem
de Türkiye açısından gereklilik arzetmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: NATO, ittifak, genişleme, Türkiye, Avrasya, Avrupa-
Atlantik, güvenlik, kimlik, ortaklık, üyelik, savunma, bölgesel, yayılma, etki
bölgesi, ilgi bölgesi
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1CHAPTER 1
1. INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War has profoundly transformed Europe's security
situation. Although traditional security issues remain important, the most immediate
threats to security since 1989 have originated not from relations between states, but
from instability and conflict within states that have threatened to spill over into the
interstate arena. The revolutions of 1989 not only discontinued communism but also
released a set of dynamics that have disjoined the peace orders of Yalta and
Versailles. War in the Balkans, instability in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and
the former Soviet Union, growing doubts about Europe's future as well as the future
role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) underscored the lack of any
stable post-Cold War European and Euro-Atlantic security order.1 States' efforts to
shape and control this new security environment have resulted in a unique hybrid
arrangement containing elements of traditional alliances, state and community
building, and collective security. (See Figure 1) By mid-1990s, the elements of Euro-
Atlantic security build-up were in place with NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation
Council (NACC), Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Partnership for Peace
(PfP), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Union (EU) and Western
European Union (WEU).2
Amidst these old and new arrangements, NATO, which has been, all
throughout Cold War period, a collective defense organization, was considered either
                                                          
1 R. Asmus, R. Kugler, "Building a new NATO", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, Is. 4, Sep/Oct93, pp. 28-41
2 Mark Almond, Europe's Backyard: The War in the Balkans, 1994, p. 55, and Sean Kay, NATO and
the Future of European Security, 1998, p. 74, and also Gregory Flynn, Henry Farrell, "Piecing
Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the `Construction' of Security in Post-Cold
War Europe", International Organization, Vol. 53, Is. 3, Summer 99, pp. 505-536
2useless or out-of-date by some statesmen and scholars at the beginning of the last
decade of 20th century.3 In order to meet the imperatives of the changing
international environment, NATO had to transform. This study intends to cover only
one of the aspects of this adaptation process, namely the geographical enlargement of
NATO. I contend that the geographical enlargement of NATO, especially on the part
of Turkey, bears implications not only for NATO itself but also for the foreign policy
that Euro-Atlantic states follow. Accordingly, in this context, this study has
significance because the arguments and views presented in this study can be brought
up when, or if, the process of enlargement continues in the following years.
Figure 1: Euro-Atlantic Security Structure in 1997
At this initial stage of my research, I wish to define the term "alliance". First,
the alliance is in its most standard definition from Glenn Snyder; "a formal
association of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified
                                                          
3 Jan Willem Honig, NATO: An Institution Under Threat, 1991, p. 3
3circumstances, against states outside of its own membership"4, as in NATO during
the Cold War.
Second, because today the security organizations began to have the meaning
beyond the task of defence and protection, it is also helpful to bear in mind the
definition of alliance by Stephen Walt:
"a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or
more states, not a collective security agreement, an arrangement between states with
very different regimes and political views and values, coming together of the states
with similar and mutually reinforcing strategic interests and ideological principles,
with a dense web of élite contacts and subsidiary agreements which exert influence
on the attitudes and behavior of members, as in NATO today.” 5
Third, as broader approaches to international security and peace became
popular, I also find it useful to quote the definition of Frank Schimmelfennig:
“from a constructivist viewpoint, NATO is best understood neither simply as
a form of alignment (as in neo-realism), nor as a functional international institution
(as in neo-liberalism), but as an organization of international community of values
and norms. NATO is embedded in the Euro-Atlantic or “Western” community and
represents its military branch”.6
More clearly, I propose to adopt a combination of above approaches, which
present strategic ideological, institutional, functional, and cooperational aspects of
commitments on behalf of the member and non-member states.7
                                                          
4 Glenn H. Snyder,  Alliance Politics, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1997, p. 4
5 Stephen Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse?”, Survival, Vol. 39, Is. 1, Spring 1997, p. 157
6 Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation”, Security Studies,
Vol.8, Is.2/3, Winter98-99, Spring 99, p. 213
7 See Chapter 4 for an elaborate approach to this linkage between NATO and its definition as an
alliance with the direction that NATO is orienting itself. It is also helpful to understand the meaning
of the Chapter 3 regarding NATO's transformation and enlargement with these approaches to alliance.
4As for, the term "enlargement", in a broader context, it is defined as any kind
of expansion, geographical, institutional, organizational and functional, so that
NATO would be able to adapt itself to changing conditions. However, the scope of
the thesis will be limited to examining the partnership approaches of PfP, EAPC, and
membership expansion of NATO only from a viewpoint of geographical
enlargement. At this point, the enlargement will include the accession of new
member states to NATO, new institutional and organizational initiatives, the
redefinition of the Transatlantic Area, and the promotion of "NATO Membership"
idea to non-members. The other main issue of functional enlargement through
NATO's acquiring new missions beyond its original duties will only shortly be
touched upon in this study.
In this thesis, the geographical enlargement process is considered to have two
main features. First is the enlargement of the geographical scope of NATO through
institutional means such as PfP and EAPC. Second is the geographical expansion of
NATO by acquiring new members into the alliance. This study also aims to examine
the implications of the above-mentioned enlargement process for Turkey.
In conformity with this consideration, I suggest the following research
questions:
What are the arguments for and against partnership (PfP and EAPC) activities
in the post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic region?
What are the arguments for and against NATO's acquisition of new members
before and after the first round of enlargement?
What are various conflicting arguments and implications of the two aspects of
NATO's geographical enlargement for Turkey's security and regional stability?
5To meet the envisaged purpose of this thesis, primarily a short but detailed
summary of the Cold War and post-Cold War dynamism of NATO will be provided
in the second chapter. Moreover, a review of the events leading to the conclusion of
NATO's first round of post-Cold War geographical expansion through membership
enlargement will be presented. The second chapter aims to put forward the
antecedents from a historical causal perspective with the emphasis that NATO has a
habit of adaptation to changing circumstances. In addition, this study will also
attempt to describe Turkey's position vis-à-vis the first actual enlargement at the
beginning of the Cold War, when Turkey became a member of the Alliance.
The third chapter will provide descriptions of PfP and EAPC. The
significance of the examination of PfP and EAPC stems from the fact that they
represent NATO's initial efforts to institutionalize its adaptation process by way of
cooperative relations with former adversaries and other non-NATO countries in the
Euro-Atlantic region. Especially PfP has been defined on various platforms as a
pathway to NATO membership for non-member partners. The EAPC members are
also likely to have similar aspirations.8 Third chapter will put forward arguments for
and against partnership (PfP and EAPC), regarding its functions and performances
following the descriptions of two initiatives on a complementary and historical basis.
Finally, I will examine Turkey's approach to partnership enlargement, the
implications of partnership activities for Turkey, such as exercises, training
programs, operations, and other activities, within PfP.
The fourth chapter is devoted to the second aspect of the enlargement process,
which is the admission of new states as members. In this chapter, along with the
fundamentals and possible approaches of the membership expansion process, I shall
                                                          
8 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliances New Roles in International Security, USIP, 1998,
p. 94, 103
6examine the arguments for and against NATO's membership enlargement. Finally, I
shall analyze the implications of the enlargement process for Turkey.
At the end of this study, I will outline an overall summing up of the major
answers to the research questions together with my personal views on NATO's
enlargement process. Although I do not intend to test theoretical propositions, I
believe that the IR theory may provide an analyst with useful insights to better
comprehend international affairs. For that reason, my treatment of the topic will also
include references to the theory of international relations to the extent that such
references will help to clarify the issues I am dealing with. The sources to be utilized
in this study are not only Primary Sources from NATO and other official sources
along with statistical or quantitative data released by official organs, but also
Secondary Sources from International Periodicals on IR Literature. With these
limitations and organizing principles, the objective of the thesis will be to provide an
informative document on NATO Enlargement. It attempts to provide an assessment
of the geographical enlargement and its implications for Turkey and the region.
7CHAPTER 2
2. NATO'S DYNAMISM
After the WWII, when Western Europe was economically devastated and
militarily weak, to the East stood a massive Soviet presence consolidating its gains
through creating satellite regimes throughout Central and Eastern Europe. In the
immediate years following the end of WWII, Soviet Union maintained 5 million
troops. The most mobile and ready portion of these troops were kept in Eastern
Europe and amounted to 30 Divisions. In their susceptible position to Soviet or
Soviet-backed movements, along with economic disaster, fragile democratic
situation, and dispirited populations, Western Europeans sought means to assure their
well being and survival.9 Although the WWII ally, the U.S., guaranteed their security
and promised to help, Western Europe needed solid reassurances and commitments.
In this context, through hardship, the Atlantic Alliance turned into the institutional
framework for a secure future in Europe.
2.1. The Origins of the North Atlantic Alliance
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the outcome of many
elaborate initiatives that took place after WWII.10 First of these initiatives was the
US-British initiative to keep the machinery of information exchange that was created
and based on the military structure of the allies during the WWII, which continued to
function after 1945. This opened the way to the initiative called “fraternal
association” in March 1946.11 The French-British Dunkirk Treaty of March 1947
                                                          
9 Richard Kuggler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War, 1993, pp.
30-36, cited in Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security, 1998, p.  13
10 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “Historical Aspects”, in NATO Enlargement Opinions and Options, ed. Jeffrey
Simon, INSS, 1995, pp. 21-32, and NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition, 1998, p. 25-27
11 Sean Kay, op. cit., p. 14
8aimed to address the possibility of the renewal of German nationalism and Soviet
intentions in the east like that of Greek civil war.12 Then Truman Doctrine was
initiated in March 1947, aiming to strengthen Turkey and Greece against
communism. The Marshall Plan, too, providing economic assistance for Western
Europe was designed to prevent the rise of nationalism, promote democracy, and
establish containment of the Soviet Union. There were also the institutionalization
initiatives, which were carried out synchronously with Truman Doctrine and
Marshall Plan from 1947 on. The creation of Brussels Pact, after the collapse of four
power dialogue on Germany, and the growing fear of Soviet challenge, proved an
initiative aimed at founding a Western Union of a collective understanding backed
by power, money and resolute action.13 The Vandenberg Resolution envisaged an
organization of continuous and effective self-help, mutual aid, and burdensharing.
The Washington working group, which framed the Transatlantic Community, was
another initiative that contributed to the development of NATO spirit. The group
included US, Canada, and the Brussels Pact Powers.
The negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty and the establishment of an
Atlantic alliance began on December 10 1948. The members of the Washington
working group; the U.S., Canada, the U.K., France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal to negotiations in
March 1949. Finally, on April 4 1949, the representatives of 12 North Atlantic
Community states signed the North Atlantic Treaty.
3.1. Dynamic Perspective of the North Atlantic Alliance
The primary reason for the Alliance was the Soviet threat in Central and
Eastern Europe. The West Europeans were also threatened by the menacing presence
                                                          
12 D. S. Yost, NATO Transformed: Alliances New Roles in International Security, USIP, 1998, p. 28
9of the Soviet Union and its early and newly acquired European satellite states.
Although the Soviet threat and the emerging bipolar system were the driving factors,
the dynamic vision of the alliance was put together by the help of multiple
contributions, emerging from a series of voluntary interactions between democratic
nations in Europe and North America.14 First, it was envisaged to use the alliance, in
order to enhance the principles of peaceful international relations and democracy, as
to reflect a broader purpose than collective defence. Second, in order to meet the
challenge of fragile economies, weak political systems, spread of nationalism and
communism, the alliance was meant to provide economic and military assistance as
to maintain the necessary and sufficient room to European allies for creating their
own national security perspective. Third, with the determination of the U.S. on the
issue, the alliance was kept in such a special institutional form that gave priority to
burdensharing and to strengthening the capacity of European allies to help
themselves. Thus, at its founding, NATO was intended to perform four tasks.15
• The collective defence posture against the Soviet Union.
• The reassurance provided to Western Europeans for their
security as to make them assume responsibility for their own security and
thus enhance alliance burdensharing.
• Strengthening and expanding the international community
based on democratic principles, individual liberty, and the rule of law in a
peaceful international society.
• Building necessary institutional structures within the alliance
and the ally states to maintain the achievement of all kinds of relevant duties.
                                                                                                                                                                    
13 Ibid., p. 28
14 David Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security", Survival, Vol. 40, Is. 2, Sum. 1998, p. 135
15 D. S. Yost, USIP, op. cit., pp. 47-72, Sean Kay, op. cit. p. 33, and Lawrence S. Kaplan op. cit. p. 21
10
However, the most dynamic features originated from the North Atlantic
Treaty.16 Above all, the NAC had the power to establish subsidiary bodies as might
be necessary (Article 9). The Alliance had the mechanism to enlarge (Article 10).
The members could review the treaty (Article 12). Any member could leave the
Alliance on its own will (Article 13). Apart from extra measures to meet
requirements for change, these features gave the Alliance capacity for change and
adaptation.17
2.3. NATO's Dynamic Character During the Cold War
In its early years of founding, NATO was insufficiently organized to honor its
security guarantee to its members. Along with the Soviet and communist expansion
in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Far East, the unbalanced conventional postures,
the technological parity regarding nuclear capabilities, the military organizational
inadequacies of NATO urged the alliance to straight things out. The years from 1950
to 1952 witnessed geographical, organizational, and institutional expansions of
NATO from political consultation to defense planning, from military restructuring to
founding subsidiary military or political organs, from organizational locationings to
geographical military deployments. Especially, the North Korean invasion of South
Korea in June 1950 prompted the allies to "put the 'O' in NATO", with the persuasion
to organize an integrated military command structure in peacetime.18
The most remarkable achievements can be enumerated as the establishment
of Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR), the merge of Western European
Union military organization to NATO, the establishment and the operationalization
of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and the accession of two
                                                          
16 See Appendix 1
17 Sean Kay, op. cit, p. 34
18 David S. Yost, USIP, op. cit., p. 29, and also Sean Kay, op. cit., p. 35
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new members, Greece and Turkey.19 Moreover, NATO synchronously made efforts
to establish standardization, interoperability, and the means of information flow.
These efforts can be described as infrastructural expansions.20
By the year 1954, the requirements for the wellbeing of the alliance's new
posture began to show up. The initial efforts in the long way in order to reach the
goal of a united Europe or to a "European Union", were put forward after the Paris
agreement. This was one of the major steps by which NATO was urged to cover a
larger part of Europe.21 Thus, the need for the accession of Germany to NATO as a
precondition for the fulfilment of collective defense plans proved inevitable and
West Germany became a member of NATO on May 5 1955. Shortly after, the USSR
with the application of the same reasoning to establish another collective defense
pole in Europe, with Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Poland, and Romania concluded the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).22
Moreover, by the early 1980's rather the same kind of reasoning for the smoothness
and effectiveness of collective defense plans had influenced and necessitated the
accession of Spain to NATO.23 (See Figure 2)
Above all, NATO also met new challenges by the 1960s. In this era,
increasing tensions between two superpowers, the Cuban Crisis, the events leading
up to the construction of the Berlin Wall, and also the French withdrawal from
NATO's military command structure proved vital tests for NATO's survival.
                                                          
19 NATO Handbook, An Alliance for the 1990's, 1989, p. 100, and L. S. Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 24-26
20 Sean Kay, op cit., p. 41
21 David S. Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security", op. cit., p. 31
22 NATO Handbook, 1989, op cit., p. 101, and L. S. Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 26-29
23 L. S. Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 30-31
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Figure 2: The Bipolar Rivalry of the Cold War24
In this context, the Harmel Report of December 13 1967 opened the door for
the reassessment of NATO's institutional tasks and provided NATO with a new
doctrine. The Harmel Doctrine broadened NATO's scope to include coordinating
multilateral activities in order to relax tensions with the Soviet Union. This doctrine
was based on parallel policies of maintaining adequate defense while seeking the
relaxation efforts in a context where the Mutually Assured Destruction25 (MAD) was
recognized.26
It is also to be noted that Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty described the
geographical limits of the Article 5 obligations.27 In other words, Article 6 excluded
the military operations out of the North Atlantic Treaty area. This principle was
particularly significant important when decolonization problems of the U.K., France,
                                                          
24 The map reflects the geographical bipolarity in Europe, from David Yost, USIP, op. cit.
25 The MAD portended that in case of a nuclear attack from either side both sides would be
annihilated because the two superpowers had acquired substantial amount of nuclear weapons, and did
not have means to evade the opponent's second strike capability.
26 "The Future Tasks of the Alliance", (Harmel Report), Paragraph 15, NATO Basic Texts, December
13-14 1967, Brussels, available at: http://www.nato.int./docu/basictxt/b671213a.htm
27 See Appendix 1
13
and Portugal had the potential to burden NATO. The Harmel Doctrine, however,
mentioned to the possibility of out-of-area activities. It adopted that events occurring
outside the treaty area can also be the subject of consultation within the Alliance. It
accepted that the preservation of peace and security in the treaty area could be
affected by events elsewhere in the world. Therefore, the NAC was empowered to
consider the overall international situation on deciding whether the event needs
reaction or not.28 During the Cold War, however, the implementation of the Harmel
Doctrine did never go beyond consultation because the allies did not reach unanimity
for an out-of-area operation.
2.4. NATO's Dynamism in the post-Cold War Era
The common aspect of the expansion and adaptation was that all the
arguments for the two processes have met with little objections, due to the context of
the Cold War.29 Nevertheless, with the unification of East and West Germany and the
demise of the USSR, the Cold War ended. The rebirth of collective security
aspirations, along with fears of nationalism, the changes regarding the European
security with the attempts to introduce militarily and politically more active
institutions to international arena, even as to challenge NATO, brought up new
debates which evolved around NATO's validity in this post-Cold War context.30
However, as far as the security aspect is concerned, no serious difficulty emerged in
the beginning of the 1990s. It was made clear that NATO would not be extending
security guarantee to any part of the former communist-ruled part of Europe, not
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even to CEE.31 NATO was adamant on not spreading its protective umbrella
eastwards across the old Cold War dividing line through Europe. On the other hand,
however, it was known that without NATO the small states of the CEE were facing
two options: either a weak alliance or entente amongst themselves or the domination
of the Serbian or Russian power.32
Furthermore, NATO appeared paralyzed when confronted with the horrific
civil conflict that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. The UN, EU, OSCE, and
NATO were unable to prevent or put an end to war in the Balkans, although the years
from 1991 to 1995 were a period of considerable institutional efforts and activities.33
However, the deadlock in finding a lasting solution, combined with collective fears
of chaos in post-Cold War Europe, led to revitalization of NATO and minimization
of the role of UN. Actually, NATO shifted from the role of a "subcontractor"
responding to restrained UN requirements to a more active participant in seeking to
stop the fighting and in defining its own mission and mandates.34 Indeed, Bosnia
provided the opportunity for NATO's first out-of-area action and set an important
precedent, providing the legitimacy needed for further policies of enlargement and
intervention in Kosovo.35 NATO's role in helping to create the conditions for peace
and in implementing its military aspects illustrated how the Alliance has adapted to
the new security environment since the end of the Cold War.36 At the same time, this
constituted the beginning of a new transformation process. However, this time the
transformation has been initiated by forces outside of NATO, such as UN call in July
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1992 to NATO to enforce UN embargoes in Adriatic Sea. At first, all of NATO's
out-of-area operations were undertaken under the authority of the UN Security
Council. However, in June 1999 NATO's intervention in Kosovo took place before a
UN mandate was approved.37 At the same time, the synchronous impetus originating
from outside of NATO gave reality to many aspects of NATO's transformation.38
2.4.1. NATO's Transformation
During the Cold War, NATO's overriding objective was to deter or defend
against an attack on Western Europe by the Soviet Union and its allies. Collective
defense was the cornerstone of the alliance. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty
stipulates that each member promises to assist any other member with "such action
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the
security" of the Euro-Atlantic area.39 Today, Russian conventional forces are not a
threat to its neighbors and Western Europe. However, most allied states continue to
emphasize NATO's traditional core mission of collective defense, in case Russia one
day again puts on a threatening posture. CEE's emphasize that they view collective
defense under Article 5 as the principal reason for their desire to join NATO.40
NATO facilitated the collective defense of its members during the Cold War, and
enlarged merely for strategic and collective defense reasons. However, after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, it had to adapt to a new, radically changed security
environment. The post-cold war era urged NATO to transform its geographical,
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organizational, and institutional identity to the new context in order to survive.41 An
overall summary of this transformation can be explained as follows:42
At the London summit of July 1990 and the Rome summit of November 1991
the vision of a new Strategic Concept indicated NATO's desire for change. NACC,
formed in November 1991, brought former adversaries together to talk and to begin
multilateral cooperation, short of partnership. The emerging political dialogue helped
CEE former WP states to understand NATO's contemporary defense requirements.
The New Strategic Concept also envisaged a number of new functions short of
conventional combat, such as crisis-management and anti-terrorist measures.
In January 1994, PfP and CJTF were introduced to create a new NATO with
both internal and external changes. PfP changed enormously since its inception at the
January 1994 Brussels Summit. Though some in CEE initially saw PfP as a pathway
to enlargement, PfP only moved non-NATO members beyond dialogue and into
practical partnership. It developed a framework and process, and established the
norm that partners should be contributors and marked a shift from purely multilateral
dialogue to bilateral (partner and Alliance) relationships in the form of Individual
Partnership Programs (IPPs) and self-differentiation. It marked the establishment of a
wide environment of cooperation, to include the Planning and Review Process
(PARP), transparency, civil control of the military, and peace support operations.
In September 1995 NATO agreed on enlargement procedures and objectives.
After the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997, the July 1997 Madrid Summit
made PfP more relevant and operational by introducing enhanced PfP. It introduced
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the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and NATO-Ukraine Commission
to keep Russia and Ukraine engaged in the partnership. At the same time, the NACC
was turned into a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997. EAPC became
the most important indicator of NATO's strengthened political structure in the post-
cold war era in a newly defined Euro-Atlantic community, whose members score up
to 46 states today.43 It announced three PfP states, Poland, Czech Republic, and
Hungary with prospective admission. In April 1999 Washington Summit, these three
states joined NATO. The 1999 summit also introduced programs to make PfP more
operational and approved a new Strategic Concept. New partnership programs,
however, created serious challenges for the Alliance in the form of greater
differentiation among the 26 partners.44
Created as a transatlantic fortification to defend Europe against a Soviet-led
international and transnational communist movement, NATO transformed into an
instrument of collective security in the new Europe. Thus, it took on new missions,
such as peacekeeping, peace enforcing, crisis management, and humanitarian
assistance.45 According to NATO's Strategic Concept of 1991, risks to allied security
were less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies.
However, due to the changing context risks were anticipated to stem from the
adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic,
social and political difficulties caused by ethnic and territorial disputes in CEE.46
Thus, the present day NATO began to take shape in 1991. The style, strategy,
and substance of NATO's moves in the Balkans and CEE influenced the credibility
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of NATO, WEU, EU, and OSCE.47 By 1995, several NATO operations were
providing support to UN Peacekeeping in the Balkans.48 The plans that NATO has
undertaken since 1993 with NACC (EAPC) and PfP were put into practice. NATO
proved its ability to deploy 60.000 troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina and anywhere in
the Balkan Peninsula when needed.49 Peacekeeping has brought together military
forces from 33 countries within the PfP. Eager to show their willingness to contribute
to a NATO operation and to enhance their prospects for membership of the Alliance,
the non-NATO member PfP countries' contingents reached 10.000 troops.50
2.4.2. NATO's Enlargement
Late in his administration, by the early 1990s, President George Bush
suggested the expansion of NATO beyond its current sixteen members.51 The North
Atlantic Council (NAC), in its July 1990 London Summit, declared that it was
possible for the Alliance to reach out to the countries of the East and extend them the
hand of friendship.52 The first outcome became the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council (NACC) whose function was to promote cooperation with the non-member
states in Euro-Atlantic area. The NACC was open to former Warsaw Pact (WP)
states and to the Newly Independent States (NIS) and focused largely on military
cooperation.53
In April 1993, Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, respectively the Presidents of
the Czech Republic and Poland urged the new U.S. President Bill Clinton to expand
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NATO eastward.54 The Clinton Administration, encouraged by demands from CEE
states and backed above all by Germany, proposed the enlargement of the alliance at
the January 1994 NATO summit. Instead of following suit, the allies initiated the PfP
program at this summit and remained cautious about enlargement.55 Thus, PfP
moved from a mere concept to implementation.56 PfP aimed to encourage its
members to democratize themselves and provided a framework for evaluating states
that may be interested in joining NATO. The program offered training to states in
such areas as development of civilian control of the military, adaptation to NATO
practices in military doctrine or operations in the field, and peacekeeping.57 Another
initiative of this summit was the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF).
This concept was designed to enable NATO forces and military assets to be
employed in a more flexible manner to deal with regional conflicts, crisis
management and peacekeeping operations. In the NAC Brussels summit of January
1994, the agreement on reliance of WEU on NATO for military staff work,
command structure, logistics, intelligence, and lift, constituted a significant effort of
adaptation58 regarding the "separable but not separate capabilities".59 NATO declared
its readiness to make its collective assets available, on the basis of consultations in
the NAC, for Western European Union (WEU) operations undertaken by the
European allies in pursuit of their common security and defense policy.60
                                                          
54 Thomas M. Leonard, op. cit., p. 524
55 See Chapter 3 of this study for a detailed approach to PfP objectives and activities.
56 Yüksel İnan, İslam Yusuf, "Partnership For Peace", Perceptions, June-Aug 99, p.69
57 Ibid., p. 72-73, and also Robin Bhatty, Rachel Bronson, "NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus
and Central Asia", Survival, Vol. 42, Is. 3, Autumn 2000, p.131
58 J. G. Ruggie, "Consolidating the European Pillar: The Key to NATO's Future", Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 20, Is. 1, Winter 97, p. 116
59 "Partnership for Peace: Declaration of the Heads of State and Government", 10-11 Jan. 1994, par. 6
60 "Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications",  Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of
NATO, Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, February 24 1997, U.S.
Department of State, text available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html
20
At the 1994 Brussels summit, NATO members also undertook a study that
would describe NATO's path towards enlargement. The study was released in
September 1995. It stated that new members must accept the full range of NATO
responsibilities, both political and military, such as building up a military
establishment under a civilian democratic control and capable to contribute to
collective defense.61 At this summit, NATO also initiated a Mediterranean Dialogue
where today all NATO member states and 7 Mediterranean countries, namely
Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, envisaged
cooperative activities in both political and military domains.62
A further step in the process of enlargement came at the NATO Ministerial
Meeting of 1996. The allies agreed to invite "one or more" candidate states (all PfP
members were considered in this category) to begin accession negotiations at the
NATO summit of July 1997. NATO was open to the accession of new members and
the communique stated that the goal was to admit new members into NATO by the
time of NATO's 50th anniversary in April 1999 while the door remains open.63
2.4.3. NATO's Enlargement and the Former Adversaries
Most European allies wished to establish relations with Russia on firmer
footing before proceeding with enlargement.64 In 1996, France proposed negotiation
of a NATO-Russia charter that would outline a cooperative framework in security
matters. The U.S. administration was at first doubtful about the proposal, but French
support for the idea ultimately led to negotiations, in which U.S. played a key role.
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On May 27, 1997, the negotiations resulted in a document called the Founding Act.
The symbolic achievement of France had led to a substantial achievement of NATO.
Although the Founding Act contributed to maintaining stability on the continent, it
also made NATO and the U.S. increasingly dominant in the European security arena
and made NATO the focal point of European security.65 In the Founding Act, NATO
declared that it will not in the foreseeable future station nuclear weapons on new
members' soil, but that it may do so should the need arise. NATO further stated that
military infrastructure adequate to assure new members' security under Article 5 of
the North Atlantic Treaty would be maintained on their territory. The alliance
pledged not to place substantial combat forces in the current and foreseeable security
environment on new members' territory, but underscored its intention to increase
interoperability, integration, and reinforcement capabilities with the new states. The
Founding Act also established a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council for
consultation on matters of mutual interest, such as peacekeeping, nuclear and
biological weapons proliferation, and terrorism, without interfering with NATO's or
Russia's internal matters.66
The Founding Act reflected the concerns of some allies that Russia should be
consulted during the enlargement process. At the same time, in the light of clear
indications that the alliance would proceed to enlargement with or without Moscow's
acquiescence, some Russian critics contended that President Yeltsin had little choice
but to sign the document, although the document gave Russia no substantive
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influence over NATO decision making.67 In the U.S., some critics, however,
contended that the document gave Russia a foothold in NATO decision making, and
that Russia might use the opening to prevent the alliance from implementing new
missions such as crisis management and peacekeeping.68
Indeed, at Paris on May 27 1997, the Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation and Security, neither clearly limiting NATO's authority to station troops
or weapons nor blocking NATO's planned eastward expansion brought Moscow into
a powerful consultative position with its former western adversaries. This paved the
road to Madrid and a new era of peaceful coexistence in Europe between Russia and
NATO.69
Furthermore, with a parallel approach to cooperation and a delicate balancing
act, in order not to leave Ukraine to Russian sphere of influence, NATO initiated the
NATO-Ukraine Partnership in the Sintra bilateral meeting on July 8 1997. NATO
concluded the initiative the day after, in Madrid summit and turned it into a charter.70
2.4.4. The Madrid Summit of 1997
After the Russian uneasiness had been soothed, it was the time to discuss
about the advantages and disadvantages of the 12 former eastern bloc nations seeking
admission to NATO, namely Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and the three Baltic States of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania.
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Figure 3: NATO Membership Aspirant European Countries71
The central issue at the Madrid summit was enlargement and its form,
although other issues such as agreement over a new alliance command structure,
enhancing Partnership for Peace, and further refinement of the Combined Joint Task
Forces concept were dealt with as well.72
On June 12 1997, Clinton administration announced that the U.S. would
support the candidacies of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary for admission
to NATO. Poland and the Czech Republic became candidates with the strongest
support. Both border Germany and lay between NATO and Russia. Poland, Czech
Republic and Hungary (which provided critical support to U.S. and NATO Bosnia
operations), had a readiness and ability to undertake the military and political
obligations of membership, including domestic political and economic reforms and
the end of any prolonged claims against neighbors.73 These three states had made the
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greatest progress in reforming their militaries, developing democratic institutions and
a free market, and ensuring civilian control of the military. Moreover, Germany was
the greatest supporter of these countries.74
The other states had also strong sponsors. France and Turkey supported
Romania and Bulgaria.75 Italy and Canada supported Slovenia. The Nordic NATO
members supported the Baltic republics for admission to NATO. The U.S. officials
concluded that the Baltic States' militaries were not sufficiently strong to contribute
meaningfully to collective defense. Some U.S. and allied officials stated that the
Baltic States could not be adequately defended under Article 5 due to their
geographic location, and the countries that cannot be defended should not be
admitted.76 Romania and Bulgaria have recently moved firmly on the path towards
democracy, and were struggling to implement a free-market economy. However, it
was believed that they must make further progress towards civilian control of their
military. Slovenia had a small defense force, able to make only a minimal military
contribution to NATO.77
Following the military success in Bosnia and its new security architecture in
place by 1997, NATO was finally ready to decide on enlargement. Although allied
states had lobbied to provide invitations to these states at Madrid, the U.S. views
became dominant. Three countries were chosen at the Madrid summit on a
compound of several criteria. At the end of 1997 NATO summit in Madrid, the allies
eventually invited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join NATO. They
declared that the door would be open to any other country ready and willing to
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shoulder the responsibilities of NATO membership.78 The new members were
admitted to NATO in 1999 Washington summit.79
Figure 4: The Enlargement of NATO 80
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2.5. Turkey vis-à-vis NATO Membership and NATO Enlargement
2.5.1. The First Enlargement Round In the Cold War
Turkey was one of the earliest applicants for NATO's earliest enlargement
move. After WWII, Turkey had been one of the first countries to receive the U.S.
aid. However, in 1949, Turkey had been rejected when she had applied for NATO
membership. At the time, Turkey's rejection had caused some important disillusion
and anxiety.81 First, the efforts on keeping the wisdom of Westernization, which has
always been the general philosophy of Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy,
had begun to be questioned. Second, in spite of the U.S. efforts to keep Turkey
distant from Soviet sphere of interest, the Soviet threat to Turkey had continued to
exist as evidenced by a series of incidents. Third, Turkish authorities had believed
that the establishment of NATO without Turkey would lead to Ankara's
abandonment by the Western allies.
However, in the following years, after the U.S. proposal had been voted for at
the meeting of the NAC in September 1951, in Ottawa, and later after the protocol of
entry for Turkey had been signed in February 1952, in Washington, Turkey became a
member of NATO.82 To this end, Turkey, right after the UN Resolution to this effect,
had decided to assign a contingent of 5.000 troops for the war in Korea in 1950. This
concrete attitude and the prowess that Turkish troops displayed in Korean War was
influential as to convince the U.S. leaders about the usefulness of Turkey as an ally.
After WWII, because of the continuing threat to her immediate neighborhood,
Turkey had preserved her readiness as to be capable of offering troops up to 22
Divisions to allies. Especially after the Korean War this had a dramatic meaning in a
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nuclear balance established between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Britain's interests
in the Middle East as to the establishment of an alliance in order to keep her hand in
the region had been backed up by Turkish promise to play a positive role. This
promise had made Britain withdraw her objections about Turkish membership to
NATO.
On the other hand, at the time, there had also been arguments against
Turkey's admission to NATO in particular and NATO's enlargement in general.83
First, Turkey's NATO membership would have meant the extension of security
commitments to the Caucasian border of the Soviet Union and this would have
increased danger of war by risking an armed conflict with the S.U. on account of
Turkey. Second, Turkey's level of conventional power would have added on the part
of NATO an indispensable weight to the balance on conventional force structure.
This would in turn have increased the efforts for armsrace. Then, Turkey's
membership to NATO would have spread NATO thin in its mission as a fortification
against Soviet Union by weakening NATO organizationally. With an increase in the
number of NATO members, the amount of the U.S. aid on part of the smaller allies
of NATO would have been decreased. Finally, because Turkey had not been a part of
the western civilized world, Turkish membership to NATO would have created an
identity question and would have negatively affected the alliance cohesion. Curiously
enough, the Western European allies are reiterating some of these arguments for
today against Turkey's EU membership. However, once Turkey's NATO
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membership was realized, Turkey consolidated its Western orientation through this
institutional and functional linkage.84
2.5.2. Turkey's Perspective on the Post-Cold War Enlargement
Since its foundation, Turkish leaders have worked to build a state that has a
strong Western component. Once it joined the Alliance, Turkey made efforts to
contribute to NATO's every activity towards acquiring new missions. However,
Turkey's participation in these transformed NATO activities has also developed
piecemeal from passive naval posts to active peacekeeping activities on the ground
from 1992 in Adriatic Sea to 1999 in Kosovo. Within this framework, in earlier
expansions of NATO (Germany and Spain), Turkey had acted in parallel with the
consensus reached in the NAC. Accordingly, before the beginning of accession talks
with the three candidates, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary, to NATO,
President Süleyman Demirel stated that Turkey would welcome the new members
and adapt itself to further enlargement.85 On the other hand, when NACC was
established and later PfP was initiated Turkey extended its friendly hand to all the
former WP countries as early as 1990. Turkey perceived the PfP, as the basis of a
dynamic and evolving Euro-Atlantic security system. It committed itself to widen
and deepen its relations with partner countries and attached particular importance to
the operational role of that initiative. 86 Furthermore, as an enthusiastic participant in
NATO's PfP, Turkey established a PfP training center in Ankara.87
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CHAPTER 3
3. ENLARGEMENT THROUGH PARTNERSHIP
Out of the ruins of World War II, the United States and Europe formed the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO successfully protected Western Europe
from Soviet attack and brought to Europe one of its longest periods of stability in
history. Out of the collapse of the Soviet Union and ashes of the Cold War, NATO
launched a new security structure for Europe. This was the picture of a new NATO, a
NATO revealing its commitment to a wider Euro-Atlantic stability, with the PfP and
EAPC at its very center.88 Accordingly, it is the aim of this chapter to describe the
facts underlying this security structure while enumerating the arguments of both
proponents and opponents of both PfP and EAPC. Because the historical
evolutionary aspects and the overall arguments of both PfP and EAPC are closely
related and complementary, these initiatives will be examined under the general
heading of the PfP.
3.1. The Genesis and Evolution of PfP
During the Cold War, the Soviet acceptance of united Germany's NATO
membership and transformation of NATO from an anti-Soviet alliance to a security
institution offering cooperation and partnership to Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union was perceived something impossible.89 However, in May 1990, President
Bush announced such a possibility in an ambitious agenda for the upcoming NATO
summit. Consequently, NATO delivered an invitation for cooperation, first through a
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symbolic declaration at the Turnberry Ministerial meeting in early June 1990, to the
Soviet Union and to all other European countries.90 The invitation was reiterated at
the NATO London Summit in July 1990.91 The London summit declaration started a
process in which NATO began its adaptation to the post-Cold war era. It:
• announced the end of the Cold War,
• invited the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to establish
permanent liaison missions with NATO,
• announced a restructuring of NATO's conventional force
posture together with new initiatives for the Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) negotiations,
• changed NATO's nuclear strategy to make nuclear forces
weapons of last resort and announced unilateral reductions of NATO's
nuclear stockpile.
The London summit, while opening the way to cooperation, constituted the
first step toward establishing institutionalized ties with the former WP countries.
Right after the summit NATO began making regular contacts with its former
enemies. Subsequently, in November 1990 in Paris, NATO and former WP nations
signed a Joint Declaration stating that they no longer regarded each other as
adversaries92.
The November 1991 Rome Summit was notable for the publication of an
historic framework document, laying down NATO’s new strategy based not only on
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collective defence, but also on cooperation and dialogue with all European countries.
A major initiative throughout this initial process of reconciliation was the
construction of the joint NATO/Partner North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC), which held its first meeting in Dec. 1991.93
The NACC met regularly at ambassadorial level and bi-annually in
ministerial sessions. Under the auspices of the NACC, a cooperation programme or
Work Plan was developed in 1992. This laid the foundation of cooperation and
dialogue94. It was limited to areas such as the sharing of information and observation
of military exercises. It simply performed a series of activities without a permanent
structure. These collection of activities, however, envisaged a new concept designed
to meet the security concerns of the CEE countries and the filling of the security
vacuum created in the heart of the continent. Major reasons for this arrangement
were the persistent demands by the East Europeans to join the alliance, the unstable
situation in Russia and the developments in the Yugoslav crisis. These same
concerns were also behind the PfP and NATO’s membership enlargement policy.95
At the June 1993 meeting of the NACC foreign ministers in Athens,
expanding NATO’s membership was not yet on the agenda.96 Later that year, the
U.S. administration revealed the upcoming NATO summit's agenda by stating that a
doctrine of containment must be replaced by a strategy of enlargement. This strategy
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would seek to update NATO, so that the expansion of market economies and
democracies should be protected by an enlarged system of collective security.97
The idea for creating a peacekeeping partnership with the CEE and NIS was
originally conceived by SACEUR, General John M. Shalikashvili.98 During the
summer and fall of 1993, Washington studied the issue of developing military ties
between NATO and its former adversaries.99 In September 1993, during the
preparations for the announced summit the U.S. proposed a solution in the form of a
“Partnership for Peace.” Officials at the Pentagon favored the PfP idea. From their
standpoint, it was non-sense to talk about expansion until after NATO had
established the type of military-to-military relationships that would enable new
countries to integrate effectively into the Alliance. The Pentagon supported a
sequential approach toward enlargement: countries would participate in the PfP for a
number of years and then the Alliance might start addressing the issue of
membership expansion.100
In October 1993, at the informal Travemunde-Germany meeting of the
NATO defense ministers, Les Aspin, then U.S. secretary of defense, presented for
the first time a detailed proposal for PfP.101 He sought to gain Alliance support for
the new project, and emphasized that NATO would not enlarge soon.102 The
launching of the PfP program was also supported by an increased U.S. involvement
in the handling of the war in the former Yugoslavia. The PfP was intended to be an
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agreement between the sixteen NATO countries and each “partner for peace,” to
offer the possibility of controlled cooperation.103 It was also an activity within the
NACC, instead of a new form of independent cooperation, which enables member
states to put off questions of formal enlargement and of NATO’s current disposition
in post-Cold War Europe.104
At Travemunde, German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, one of the first
advocates of NATO’s enlargement,105 received the U.S. initiative positively. The
Germans eagerly embraced the PfP, as to constitute the European bridgehead of PfP,
even though their interpretation of its significance differed from that of the U.S.
From German point of view, PfP served and represented Germany's new
Ostpolitik.106 Germany also noted that PfP was not to be regarded as a substitute to
NATO membership.”107 At the same time, to Germans, this initiative had inadequate
relationship with NACC. They believed that opportunities were limited for a broad-
based political cooperation because of PfP’s focus on military cooperation. There
was also ambiguity within NATO about how and to what degree to include Russia in
partnership activities.108
However, despite its weaknesses, PfP was better than an alternative regional
alliance in CEE 109 or a deal with Moscow in order to keep the CEE region under
control.110 For Germany, the PfP, despite its shortcomings, was an excellent
opportunity to work for the integration of the CEE countries into both NATO and the
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EU. PfP was an opportunity not only to ensure security in the heart of Europe, “but
also to keep the Germans themselves from any choices between East and West.”111
At the Brussels NATO summit in January 1994, three PfP documents were
approved; an invitation to countries wishing to take part in the program, a framework
document for the PfP, and a document laying out the understanding of the PfP and
Partners by NATO members.112
The PfP began to function under the NAC. The Alliance invited partners to
participate in NATO’s political and military activities in PfP framework. Moreover, a
self-differentiation approach allowed each Partner to determine the nature and depth
of the cooperation, unlike NACC whose work plan applied to everyone. Every
partner, with regard to its own capacity and desire, planned its own pace and scope
for cooperation. They were also expected to define their own ways of work with the
alliance. Furthermore, a 16+1 formula permitted the alliance to handle the approach
and will of every partner individually and led to the formulization of Individual
Partnership Programs (IPP). Finally, it was made clear to the CEEs that NATO was
concerned about their internal stability and security, without giving them a formal
guarantee of security and without letting Moscow accuse NATO of enticing these
countries into the Western bloc, by allowing Russia, too, to take part in.113
All members of PfP were invited to establish liaison offices with NATO
headquarters, as well as Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE). PfP
became flexible concerning the degree of engagement that every state wishes to
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perform with NATO. There was also the possibility of new agreements with the
Alliance in case NATO accepted cooperation on the fields a partner proposes.114
On the other hand, the activities of the PfP began to be coordinated with those
of the NACC, to provide effectiveness and avoid duplication of the NACC work
plan. PfP activities in the fields of crisis control and military planning, especially the
planning of exercises and other training activities were coordinated via the newly
established Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons, which functioned under
the NAC.115
By the end of 1994, with the introduction of the Planning and Review Process
(PARP) for the interested Partners, the emphasis within the PfP shifted from
peacekeeping exercises to planning. Those countries that chose to integrate closely
with NATO planning were invited to join the PARP. They were, every two years, to
exchange data on their defense plans and budgets, and identify areas in which they
agree to improve interoperability between their military forces and those of NATO.
PARP applied to a variety of fields such as: peacekeeping, search and rescue, and
humanitarian operations.116 Moreover, a Political-Military Steering Committee
(PMSC) became the most active PfP forum. It could meet, depending on the subject,
in various combinations:117
• the 16, (only alliance members)
• the 16+1, (alliance members plus one partner)
• the 16+several partners, (alliance members plus one or more partners)
• in a full NACC combination, (all members of NATO and all partners)
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Furthermore, the activities of the NACC and the PfP were being increasingly
combined. The PfP concentrated on practical defense-related and military
cooperation activities, while the NACC was the forum for broad consultations on
security issues, including security-related political and economic issues.118 The
purpose of PfP was to enable intensive political and military-to-military cooperation
with Europe's new democracies as well as other states, such as the neutrals. In order
to create a practical security cooperation that Europe needed most, PfP sought to
develop and strengthen the capacity to work together in the fields of peacekeeping,
crisis management, and humanitarian operations.119 PfP facilitated transparency in
national defence planning and budgeting processes, and democratic control of
defence forces by supporting reform of militaries and defense ministries. By pushing
Partner militaries' democratizations, it created a potential of reforms, which can spill
over to other parts of society. PfP also provided engagement of these CEE states in a
wide range of practical NATO efforts, from standardizing equipment and procedures
to joining alliance forces both in military exercises and in the crisis zone of
Bosnia.120 However, the allies also recognized the need to complement PfP with a
more political forum than NACC.121
Foreseeing the inevitable enlargement of NATO membership, NATO made
PfP a means to enlarge NATO without weakening the alliance and without
provoking a hostile response from Russia, to admit only a few countries without
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isolating the others.122 Thus, NATO began to prepare solutions to prevent the
emergence of new “dividing lines” in Europe after enlargement. In order to give the
partnership with “non-Allies” a new and more profound meaning, NATO’s
September 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement" announced that PfP would become
a significant institution for strengthening security in Europe secondary to NATO
enlargement.123
The Allied and Partner Foreign Ministers meeting at Sintra, Portugal, on 30
May 1997, dissolved NACC and merged its role with PfP under an overarching
cooperation organization, the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The EAPC
attempted to give partners an added sense of involvement with the alliance and
allowed them to build stronger political relations with the Alliance.124 With a
decision to strengthen PfP it offered:125
• First, greater involvement of Partners in decision making within the PfP and
scope for them to develop their own PfP programs by enabling Partners to choose
as many as they wish from amongst a broad menu of PfP options, ranging from
civil aviation activities to peace enforcement exercises,
• Second, with an expanded scope of PfP exercises with the emphasis on increased
quality and sophistication, unlike previous approach the alliance began to include
peace enforcement missions in its exercises,
• Third, the involvement of Partners in planning and execution of PfP activities,
unlike previous practices where the partner representatives were involved in
planning phase only as liaison personnel,
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• Fourth, the appointment of Partners to international posts at the PCC in Mons,
• Fifth, the involvement of national personnel from Partner nations in the
Alliance's CJTF Headquarters,
• Sixth, an expansion of the PARP with the aim of making it more like the NATO
Force Planning System,
• Finally, freedom for greater scope within PfP regarding Partners' regional
cooperation activities.
Afterwards, NATO introduced the “Concept for Enhanced and More
Operational PfP” in Madrid in July 1997. 126 Moreover, PfP also offered signatories
the right to refer any situation to the NAC that could threaten their integrity,
independence, and security.127 While a distinction between Allies protected by
Article 5 (which calls for collective self-defense) and the Partners was inevitably
envisaged, this constituted an extension of the provisions of Article 4 (which calls for
consultation) of the Washington Treaty.128 More openly, this allowed Partners an
access to the governing body of NATO since both PfP and NATO members could
call for consultations under Article 4.129 However, the essential purpose of
safeguarding the freedom and security of its members under the provisions of Article
5 remained intact.130
The new dynamism of cooperation and partnership along with adoption of a
larger scope of stability, and the wide European participation including Russia by the
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mid-1990's to act together with a transformed NATO became the anchor of a
cooperative security regime in Europe. NATO survived the end of the Cold War
quite well, contrary to what some theorists predicted in 1990.131
3.2. PfP Today
Since its creation, the enhanced PfP and EAPC narrowed the gap between
NATO members and its partners. They constituted a very successful programme of
military and political cooperation. Together they became an essential component in
building the European cooperative security and proved their worth in Bosnia and the
Balkans where thirteen or more NATO and PfP states are making substantial
contributions to the NATO-led peacekeeping missions.132
Today after the first round of NATO Enlargement, PfP and EAPC are
permanent features of the European security architecture. On NATO's 50th
anniversary summit, NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) substantially
established the linkage between PfP and NATO enlargement. Each NATO
membership aspirant PfP member, provided to have devoted enough fund and
resources, can apply to MAP to establish a pathway to NATO membership. On part
of NATO as a practical manifestation of the NATO Open Door policy stemming
from Article 10 of Washington Treaty, the MAPs identify five partner activity areas
that develop the capabilities needed for membership.133 Furthermore, the PfP
biennial programme, in which Allies and Partners participate, now contains more
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than 2,000 activities, ranging from large military exercises down to small workshops
grouping a handful of people, PfP touches virtually all areas of NATO’s activity.134
On the other hand, the Washington Summit has also provided serious
challenges for PfP in the form of a greater differentiation than self-differentiation
with these MAPs. In addition, because it is implausible to admit nine new members
for the second round in the near term, the NAC must successfully deal with the
expectations and needs of the MAP partners. Those declared interest in NATO
membership include;135 Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia, who are downsizing their
military, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Slovenia, who are building new armed
forces, Albania and Macedonia, who still have security problems to solve. On the
other hand, the 17 non-MAP partners are Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and
Croatia, as well as the neutrals; Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Switzerland,
the Caucasians; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and the Central Asians;
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. (See Figure 4 and Figure 5)
3.3. EAPC Today
The EAPC acts as a political roof for PfP. It offers the 19 Allies and 27
Partners a forum to exchange views on common security issues, providing for regular
consultation and cooperation.136 It meets periodically at the level of Ambassadors
and Foreign and Defence Ministers, and Heads of State and Government. Almost all
of the non-NATO EAPC members established diplomatic missions and are
expanding contacts with NATO to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of
cooperation.
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EAPC also helps to foster practical regional security cooperation through
topical seminars that form part of the EAPC action plan. The representatives of the
46 members in Washington in April 1999 concentrated on key-security challenges in
the EAPC area, in particular the situation in the Balkans. They issued two documents
relating to further development of PfP:137
• "Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations", which addresses
the involvement of Partner countries in political consultations and decision-
making,  in operational planning and in command arrangements for future
NATO-led operations in which they participate,
• "Towards an Enhanced and More Operational Partnership for the 21st Century",
which is designed to make the PfP more operational.
In this respect, areas of EAPC consultations and cooperation include
development of a direct political relationship with the Alliance, helping to afford
partner countries increased decision-making opportunities, and providing a forum for
an increased range of subjects for consultations. EAPC activities, like those of PfP,
run on a two-year action plan. The plan focuses on consultation and cooperation on a
range of political and security-related matters, including regional issues, arms
control, international terrorism, peacekeeping, defence economic issues, civil
emergency planning, and scientific and environmental issues. 138
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Figure 5: A map of the NATO/PfP Countries as of 13 August 1999. In Dec. 1999 Ireland has joined PfP. (See Table 1)139
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3.4. Arguments Related to PfP
3.4.1. Arguments In Support of PfP
Since 1990, with the NACC (EAPC) and PfP, NATO has made valuable
efforts to extend the zone of peace, prosperity, and security eastward, and assisted to
the stability in the former Soviet bloc.140 However, when PfP first appeared as an
idea, it was compared to NATO enlargement. It was argued that PfP had some big
advantages over proposals to offer full, immediate NATO membership to Eastern
European countries.141 First, it avoided drawing new security lines across the map of
Europe liable to be destabilizing. Instead of drawing new lines that divide nations,
the PfP established new lines that connect nations by providing shelter for all
Europeans who want to align for cooperation. Second, the Partnership set up the right
incentives. It offered aspiration of an alliance based on shared values of democracy
and the free market. Third, it provided equal opportunities for all eligible countries,
but measured progress entirely on the behaviour of individual states. PfP ensures that
distinctions between countries are drawn on the basis of their own efforts, not some
abstract set of criteria. In other words, it used a self-selecting method. The more a
country achieves the more likely it will get closer to achieve membership of NATO.
Finally, PfP put the question of NATO membership where it belongs, at the end of
the process rather than at the beginning. After having some experience with the
Partnership process, it would be clearer which among the eligible nations genuinely
wants to be in the NATO ideas of shared democratic values and cooperative security.
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With another overall review, as an instrument to avoid a discussion about
NATO’s enlargement, PfP was at first presented as a structure which "neither
promises NATO membership, nor precludes this membership". The partnership was
deliberately designed to enable member states to put off questions of formal
enlargement and of NATO's ultimate disposition in post-Cold War Europe.142 Once
PfP became popular, the same concept was presented as the road to NATO
membership. PfP has provided the necessary time and basic steps to acclimatise
prospective members to NATO thinking and practices.143 Interestingly, however, it
was not PfP which dictated either the pace of NATO’s enlargement or the timing of
the process; PfP hid an essentially political debate for the well-being and survival of
the alliance which was conducted within the alliance and not allowed the aspirants to
be involved.144
PfP has in its framework document formalized for the first time the reliance
of WEU largely on NATO for military staff work, command structure, logistics,
intelligence, and lift.145  In this way, the EU drive which has its origins in WEU
mentality, to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was by PfP kept
from destroying the heart of NATO's integrated approach to military planning and
combat.146 Indeed PfP provided a NATO controlled playground for European
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) by allowing WEU members to conduct their
own regional activities.
Through its PfP Framework Document, NATO has made a commitment to
PfP members to consult with any active participant in the PfP in case that Partner
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perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.
Although this is not a defense pledge, it is not meaningless. All the same, it leaves
the door open for NATO to decide whether it wants to aid a state under restraint,
coercion or attack.147 This inevitably cast the shadow of a successful alliance on hard
security issues in Euro-Atlantic region. Accordingly, the military cooperation in
terms of training and joint manoeuvres, preparations for peacekeeping and for
meeting the new soft threats emerging after the Cold War, was organized within the
framework of PfP. Within EAPC, which all participating states have a seat, NATO
posture regarding soft security concerns was revealed and made to identify by non-
NATO Europeans.148
In today's Euro-Atlantic region, where conflict or the threat of conflict is
always present, PfP and EAPC made NATO turn into an "international regime"
aimed at peacemaking (as in Bosnia), civil-military socialization (via PfP),
confidence-building (via EAPC, through efforts to ensure resolution of tensions
between neighbors), and other collective endeavors. In this way, PfP played an
important role for NATO to export more countries the traditions of civilian authority,
parliamentary habits, and devotion to human rights, as to the political cost of
enlargement be decreased.149
Through NATO's PfP and its EAPC, virtually every nation from Kazakhstan
(Central Asia) to Canada (North America), acquired the capability to act side by side
with NATO. They shaped the exercises, missions, and policies undertaken with
them, ruling out any possibility to perpetuate arbitrary lines of division in newly
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defined Euro-Atlantic region.150 This seems to constitute a giant initial step in a
world of globalization as to globalize the post-Cold War concept of security.151
PfP is also regarded as an instrument to stabilize CEE and facilitate NATO
enlargement without offending Russia. In turn stabilization was useful against future
Russian expansion, against an independent German Ostpolitik, and against a possible
German-Russian conflict.152 In order to accomplish this, PfP served as a means to
build up a delicate balancing act between the reassurance of Russia and of the
democracies in CEE.153 Furthermore, US sought to make NATO "Russia-friendly"
through Russian participation in the PfP.154
PfP plays a critical role in promoting Western-style reform of the armed
forces of CEE and Eurasia and helps them become more interoperable with NATO.
Some European nations desire strengthened ties with the Alliance but not NATO
membership. PfP provides an ideal vehicle for any kind of relationships. It
formalizes relations, provides a mechanism for mutual beneficial interaction and
establishes a sound basis for combined action when desired. This can be seen in the
major contributions that some partners have made to NATO missions in the
Balkans.155
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Unlike the procedures in NACC, the PfP plan envisaged from the start a
process of self-differentiation, since cooperation agreements were signed between
NATO and individual countries. With this partnership vision, NATO reached out to
the peoples in CEE who endured decades of totalitarianism, to give them a taste and
feel of Western values of their own will. NATO put forward, neither an obligatory
nor a clear cut, operational/procedural criteria. This partnership vision assisted
NATO in two ways. First, from US-NATO perspective, the PfP intended to create
the possibility of reacting quickly to potential crises in Europe by means of political
consultations based on Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. NATO established a
ground for consensus in a multilateral framework through PfP.  Second, achievement
of such a multilateral framework through developing bilateral security cooperation
primarily between NATO and individual partners, helped NATO to retain complete
control over the evolution of PfP and new Euro-Atlantic security structure.
Otherwise, an uncontrolled institutionalization of a multilateral undertaking might
have jeopardized the objectives of both stability and expansion.
Today, contrary to predictions of a rapid death of PfP after the first round of
NATO Enlargement,156 PfP continues to evolve and support the transformation of the
Alliance. NATO views it as a dynamic process that will progressively draw NATO
and Partners closer to each other, since almost all elements of PfP are related to
NATO's new roles and missions. To some, as it was right before the first round of
enlargement PfP is still supported and preferable to NATO enlargement with its
accomplishments already in the tasks of ensuring civilian control of the military,
transparent defense budgets, and training for NATO's new missions.157
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3.4.2. Arguments Against PfP
At the beginning, there were suspicions about PfP's long-term implications.
NATO feared that it might not meet the expectations regarding accession to NATO
membership that dedicated PfP members raised.158 Despite its promise and now
recognized success, NATO's PfP provoked immediate attack when President Clinton
presented his vision of PfP in 1993. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
argued that the Partnership for Peace would "create a vacuum in Eastern Europe" and
"dilute what's left of the Atlantic Alliance into a vague multilateralism". Former
Secretary of State James Baker claimed that PfP would just confuse the Western
Europeans, unsettle the Russians, and fail to reassure everyone else. In order to
prevent this, NATO/US was initially intent on restricting the PfP to a series of
bilateral agreements between individual states and NATO.159
Another approach perceived PfP as inefficient in addressing the requirements
of new Euro-Atlantic security structure. This perspective argued that in addition to
programmatic efforts within NATO and PfP, the U.S. reached further to enhance
cooperative security with countries like Romania and Ukraine. These states were
seeking an alliance with the U.S. through NATO membership. However, the U.S.
tried to compensate these states' denied alliances or non-allied security relationships
with strategic partnerships without making hard security commitments.160 All the
same, these strategic partners are still the most eager seekers of NATO membership.
Apparently, neither strategic partnership cloak nor the programmatic efforts within
NATO such as PfP and EAPC have satisfied the CEE states' desire to bandwagon
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Western alliance and no initiative could take the place of NATO membership.
Accordingly, although the PfP framework was intended to delay or prevent NATO
enlargement, it backfired and did just the opposite.161 Not any of CEE countries
accepted being regarded in a secondary position as an ally or partner. Thus, all tried
hard to gain NATO membership and still do.
Some Russian and Western analysts argued that the PfP provoked Moscow to
form anti-western alignments. In fact, in 1995, Russia and Iran embarked on a
strategic relationship. NATO's thoughts of expanding eastward and the new PfP is
making Russia look around hurriedly for at least some kind of strategic allies. In this
situation, the anti-Western and anti-American regime in Iran would be a natural and
very important partner.162 With the Chechen war and NATO expansion, Russian
nationalists looked to a closer relationship with Iran as a counterbalance.163 The
recent developments in January 2001 on Russian-Iranian arms transfer seem to
validate the concerns related to Russian acts against NATO. Russia has unilaterally
denounced the U.S.-Russian agreement to limit the extent of transfers on Russian
arms transfer to Iran.
For others, PfP membership and consequently the promise of NATO entry
have failed to generate a significant improvement of civilian control over national
security matters in PfP members.164 In this regard, NATO's enlargement process
failed in addressing the needs to complete the transformation of forging civil armies
through focused programs within or appended to PfP.  Furthermore, the allies appear
reluctant to fully fund PfP and bilateral efforts in CEE to promote military reforms
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and to spread security throughout the region. On the contrary, they must sponsor and
fund programs for CEE countries still unsure of their destiny and the staying power
of the West. Whether these efforts serve as a way station to NATO membership or
substitute for it, allies must make investments equal to the historic nature of the task.
The NATO Washington Summit in 1999 and the war in Kosovo posed
serious challenges for the PfP in implementing reforms among its partners and
dealing with the expectations of the nine partners seeking NATO membership.
Because the nine partners of the MAP have heightened expectations of NATO
membership, the continuing lack of an invitation could lead to disillusionment. This
could also lead to cleavage among MAP partners. Lessons learned by Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic suggest that the nine MAP partners may find their
human and material resources overwhelmed in harmonizing NATO Standardized
Agreements (STANAGs) to their defense establishments. The result could develop
two-tier armed forces in the MAP states, one tier designed to function within the PfP,
the second developed according to national defense, but neither able to function well
as a whole.165
On the other hand, creation and existence of any lack of transparency may
undermine stability in CEE. The individual approach to NATO membership in the
form of self-differentiation, which is the essence of PfP, unless supported with full
openness may not promote cooperation between partner countries. This would even
undermine existing regional security cooperation, like that of happening between
Visegrad Four. The transparency of Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs) and the
access to these documents is important on the future of Euro-Atlantic security.166
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In addition, the PfP goal of establishing inter-operability of military structures
and equipment may open the door for future western weapons or technology
transfers to selected PfP countries. Actually, NATO countries' differentiation in
transferring the excess military equipment to CEE and Central Asian countries may
undermine the stability in the Eurasian region. Such a development, in the context of
semi-transparency, may heighten tensions between recipients and non-recipients and
boost the popularity of nationalist forces in the excluded countries.167
3.5. Turkey and Partnerships
 “In our opinion, the first and the most important condition for the
development of political confidence in the international arena is the sincere
agreement of nations at least on the idea of preserving peace”. (Atatürk, 1932)
Until today, Turkey contributed to peace operations in Korea, Iran-Iraq,
Kuwait, Northern Iraq, Somalia, Georgia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania,
and Palestine. Today, it is making every effort to contribute to regional and global
peace. Thus, Turkey frequently contacts high level officials from PfP countries, from
the Balkan and CEE as well as from Caucasian and Central Asian states, with a view
to provide them support to join and integrate with Europe.168
The new risks and challenges that could affect the whole western world have
increased Turkey's importance as a flank country. Turkey is one of the few western
countries whose importance has increased in the post-Cold War period. NATO made
possible the participation of Caspian and Central Asian states in NATO's PfP and in
the regional peacekeeping organizations. In addition, the allied forces stage regular
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exercises with units from Caspian states. However, the reality is that only a few
NATO allies, such as the U.S. and Turkey would readily accept the independence of
these states to be a vital interest. As an individual NATO member, Turkey, along
with the U.S. is steadily expanding military-to-military contacts with regional
military establishments.169 Although limited and confined to military realm, these
initiatives are useful to create a milieu favorable to Turkey's security and other
interests in the Caucasus and the Central Asia.
On the other hand, the development of Caspian energy resources and
transportation routes is directly linked to the security of the South Caucasus and the
Black Sea region. It should be noted that NATO's PfP (enlargement) already
contributed to this directly or indirectly by providing training and security structures
and by increasing the level of cooperation between allies and regional states. In
addition, it might be stated that Turkey's interests overlap with those of the allies on
the issue of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. It is also the pipeline map that
provides the link between economic development on Turkey's immediate regional
neighborhood and NATO's eastward PfP expansion. The Caspian gas and oil
reserves have to rely on pipeline and tanker routes that pass near the areas threatened
by instability and on the borders of the enlarged NATO. The Baku-Supsa pipeline,
opened in April 1999, ends on the Black Sea where oil is then shipped by tanker
through the Bosphorus and along the coasts of Greece and Turkey. A new pipeline is
about to be constructed from Azerbaijan to the Turkish coast at Ceyhan.170
Accordingly, Turkey pays great importance to the PfP programme, considering it as
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an important mechanism to enlarge the peaceful environment by improving friendly
relations further with all PfP countries. Turkey actively participates in PfP exercises,
providing support and even leading in many of the initiatives directed at regional
security. Turkey continues to maintain a peacekeeping unit in the Balkans and runs a
PfP training center in Turkey.171
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have been keeping its active contribution to the
peaceful environment since the end of the Cold War by high level visits,
participation in PfP exercises, joining in peace support operations and providing
education and training support. Turkey has provided education and training support
to neighbor partner nations, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia either at the
TAF training facilities or in their own territory. Military cooperation activities
conducted by Turkey concentrates on improving the neighboring partners' ability to
reach the NATO Interoperability Objectives (IOs).172
Nationally sponsored cooperation activities are essential for complementing
and enhancing NATO's military cooperation efforts. Therefore, Turkey grants
various training possibilities to hundreds of personnel from partner nations since the
beginning of the PfP programme to facilitate the implementation of PfP military
activities. By 1998, 1575 military personnel from various PfP countries were
educated and trained in Turkey and in some partner countries in the framework of
"PfP" and "in the spirit of PfP activities". As of November 1998, 1129 military
personnel from various PfP countries attended activities at several military training
institutions in Turkey. Military personnel of PfP countries take these educations on
donation basis and Turkey meets all of their expenditures. Additionally, they are paid
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a certain amount for living. As total, up to 1998, 70 million USD was spent for this
purpose.173 Up to spring 1999, only with Bulgaria Turkey has signed seven military
agreements. Turkey has jointly conducted approximately 150 military activities.174
3.5.1. PfP Training Center
Turkey declared her intention to establish a PfP Training Center (PfPTC) to
enhance her existing contributions to PfP activities at the first EAPC meeting at
Sintra, Portugal in May 1997. PfPTC was established on 9th March 1998. The
headquarters is located in Ankara.175 The PfPTC inaugurated on 29 June 1998 and
according to the NATO’s “Concept of PfP Training Centers”, all procedures were
completed and NATO recognized and accredited PfP Training Center on 12 February
1999. Following the Turkish example, several other TCs have been established in
recent years. The PfPTCs already established in other partner countries are Yavoriv
Training Center (Ukraine), Almnas PfPTC (Sweden), Bucharest PfPTC (Romania),
Geneva Center for Security Policy (Switzerland), and Austrian International Peace
Support Command.176
The Ankara PfPTC has been since the inauguration and is an important step
to improve existing close relations with PfP countries as to contribute to worldwide
peace in the light of NATO/PfP activities. This center not only conducts regional
activities but also serves worldwide and cooperates with all peace related institutions
in the world. The Ankara PfPTC makes great contribution to the efforts of PfP
countries to meet their requirements to reach NATO standards. The purpose of the
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support given by Turkey to the personnel of these PfP countries is to assist them for
adaptation to NATO’s doctrine, principles, tactics, procedures and standards. A great
number of participants from 27 partners and 19 members attend from time to time
PfP activities in Turkey via PfPTC.177 Until today, Albania, Azerbaijan, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldavia, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan
participated in the activities. The subjects are PfP Concept and PfP Activities
Planning Procedures, PfP Exercises, Peace Support Operations, Logistics in Peace
Support Operations, and International Decision Mechanism. 178
Military training cooperation activities conducted by Turkey concentrates on
improving the ability of partner nations to conduct operations with NATO. These
include military visits, military school, college and academy training or field training
and education, various short term courses, on-the-job training at units, headquarters
and institutions, unit/personnel exchange, cooperation in the field of military history,
archives and museology, joint exercises, sending observers to exercises. All of these
activities are compatible with NATO/PfP spirit and lead to develop friendly
relations, and Turkey’s military cooperation activities significantly contribute to the
security and peace in the region and in the world.179 On the other hand, Turkey has
already signed bilateral training agreements with 32 friendly countries, including 13
PfP countries and 4 countries which have taken part in Mediterranean Dialogue.
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Negotiations about training agreements are continuing on the same issue with 9
countries, including 6 PfP countries.180
In addition to the PfP countries, Turkey provides training opportunities to
personnel from non-PfP countries like Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation,
Croatia, Gambia, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, and Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus, Pakistan, and South Korea. NATO countries such as the U.S., Germany, and
France are also provided with training opportunities. By means of PfPTC, Turkey
will increase its important role in the Euro-Atlantic region, where different
geographies, histories, military cultures, and different national interests exist.
3.5.1.1. PfPTC Training and Education Principles
The mission of PfPTC is to plan and coordinate all PfP training and education
activities (except for exercises for which PCC is responsible) at strategic (military-
political), operational, tactical, technical level and language courses. (See Table 2)
Figure 6 181
Some courses are conducted directly by the center while others are conducted
at different academies, military schools and training centers under the command of
Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie Training and Doctrine Commands.182 The
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PfPTC has a special organization because of the need to conduct international
activities mentioned above.183 (See above Figure) PfPTC has the authority to
exchange information and make coordination with national and international military
and civilian organizations to fulfil its missions. The coordination with NATO Hqs,
and PCC is especially important and necessary. Furthermore, the cooperation with
other military and civilian training centers in other countries and international
organizations lead to exchange of experiences, lessons-learned, instructors and
documentation. This provides consistent developments and rapprochement for all.
The principal objective of the Ankara PfPTC is to provide qualitative
education and training support to military and civilian personnel of partner nations to
reach IOs. All the courses are open to all partners as well as NATO allies. The
activities shall not create any dividing lines.184
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Table 1: PfP Signatories185
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Table 2: Turkish Participation in PfP Exercises186
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CHAPTER 4
4. ENLARGEMENT THROUGH MEMBERSHIP
4.1. Fundamentals of NATO's Membership Enlargement
In light of the overall transformation of existing institutions, various concepts
became the issue about the future of the security system in Euro-Atlantic region. At
the same time, there appeared a need for a single, holistic security organisation,
replacing present organisations, able to respond to challenges both within, and from
outside, in which all states should have an equal voice. This was thought to be an
entirely new security system as a forerunner of the future united Europe, which
would provide some sort of security background or security guarantees, for which
NATO could serve as a nucleus.187 However, most of the democratic nations of the
Euro-Atlantic region were not ready to jointly forge such a new security order.
Therefore, after a short period of hesitation, NATO assumed the responsibility to
build up a new system by a policy of enlargement.188 In addition to various
developments and organizational changes, NATO's enlargement through
membership stood out as the fundamental part of a broader process of moving from
the "traditional NATO" to a "new NATO".189 In order to emphasize the evolutionary
character of membership enlargement, the following interpretations and
classifications of incidents are in order:190
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An informal and ideal spark about the NATO membership took place with
the NATO declaration at its 1991 Strategic Concept about the threat perceptions in
the Euro-Atlantic region. NATO saw to the turmoil in CEE states as a threat to itself
and the Europe. Believing that only West's international organizations could provide
the internal and external security against the existing turmoil, membership in all of
these West European organizations became the central foreign policy of CEE states.
Moreover, NATO membership presented the ideal priority for the security that each
new CEE government sought.
The creation of new formal associations with the CEE states raised their
expectations for NATO membership. The NACC as the first of this kind of
association created a formal link for December 1991. In 1992, NATO established
linkages with both OSCE and UN especially in the field of peacekeeping. In 1993, it
initiated the CJTF. These were the first steps in the transformation of NATO, leading
to the enlargement of the Alliance.
By the end of 1993 the above-mentioned linkages did not satisfy the aspiring
states that began to perceive NACC, OSCE, CJTF as the way to NATO membership.
Pressures to the alliance from CEE governments including and even from the EU led
the U.S. administration and the Alliance to formally consider the possibilities of an
enlargement. However, as pressure and discussions persisted, NATO decided to give
the CEE states a taste of what they wanted. The Alliance established PfP in January
1994. The CEE states regarded PfP as a major step towards their ultimate goal of full
NATO membership. These moves paved the way to the actual enlargement because
NATO put up an institutional mechanism linking member governments to CEE
governments while a possible emergence of de facto security guarantee relationship
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was recognized.191 Then came the formal principles of NATO enlargement. As
declared to all partners in their individual PfP protocols, the alliance was open to new
members. This required the establishment of a framework for enlargement. In
September 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement" met this need.
The U.S. administration named Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic as
probable future members in autumn 1996. That was the "no-way-back" moment for
NATO's membership enlargement process. In the Madrid summit of July 1997 the
alliance formally invited these three states from amongst a dozen aspiring states.
Though not giving a specific agenda, the summit announced the possibility of future
membership invitations.
On 12 March 1999, a month before NATO's 50th anniversary, former Warsaw
Pact countries, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, became NATO members.
The logic of NATO's membership enlargement has evolved on three
rationales. First, Article 10 of NATO's charter states that all free and democratic
countries that want to join and can contribute to NATO are entitled to apply. The
second rationale predicated on a promise made to certain countries during the Cold
War, that once freed from the WP, NATO would look favorably on their
membership. The third rationale assumed that enlargement would break down
definitively the Cold War's dividing line.192
4.1.1. A Spectrum of Approaches to Membership Enlargement
There were different broad approaches for the alliance on how far
membership enlargement should go and how to get there. Each approach leads to an
enlarged NATO, with different rationale, assumptions, timetable, and criteria. The
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following paragraphs highlight some of the essential elements of each proposed
approach in order to clarify the background of the debate on enlargement.193
The first approach is an open door policy based on self-differentiation.194 The
aspirant countries' ability to meet the standards the alliance sets for new members
determines enlargement's extent and pace. In principle, membership is open to all
participants in PfP.195 The aspirant partners establish the speed and extent of their
transition to full NATO membership. Moreover, the self-differentiation is
accomplished through PfP programs. This approach also leaves the door open to both
Ukraine and Russia,196 lessening their sense of isolation from Europe and softening
Moscow's opposition to enlargement.197
Another approach to NATO's membership enlargement can be termed
parallel expansion. 198 NATO enlargement is part of the process of unifying the
continent to produce a single Europe whole and free as a commitment to economic
liberty, social justice, and environmental responsibility.199 However, excludes
countries like Ukraine and Russia. It is assumed that NATO's membership
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enlargement would be easier to rationalize for such countries if enlargement is
portrayed as the logical extension of European integration led by the EU.200
A third approach holds that NATO's membership enlargement would not take
place or would not repeat after a first round, unless and until Russia moves in an
authoritarian or expansionist direction and again poses a military threat to CEE
countries.201 This approach prescribes that NATO limits its enlargement on strategic
criteria and geopolitical reasons while granting membership to only a handful of
countries in CEE.202 NATO's assessment of its own strategic interests, rather than the
broader vision of Europe's future or an EU list, determines the new members.203 This
approach contends that the U.S. and the EU top policy priority should be to stabilize
Russia.204 An early expansion may destroy Russian stabilization approach because it
will provoke Moscow and contribute to a resurgent Russian threat.205 However, in
case a new Russian threat emerges, then the Alliance will enlarge quickly. This
approach is the best strategy for minimizing conflict with Russia over enlargement.
Another approach sees no urgent reason for the Alliance to expand in the near
future. The main problems facing CEE countries are economic and political and not
military threats. Therefore, the objective should be the integration of CEE countries
into the EU as the best means to address these problems. With these assessments, this
approach emphasizes the importance of moving slowly, and using the time to ease
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concerns in the EU and to diminish the risk of new confrontations with Moscow.206
NATO expansion might take place in some ten years. However, the stability and
security issues, are European issues and, therefore, the EU should take the lead.207
A final approach, in contrast to previous, asserts that the political and
economic situation in CEE is fragile.208 The consequences of the collapse of
communism and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union along with the security
vacuum threatens the fragile new democracies in CEE. This approach emphasizes the
linkage between democracy and security. NATO should provide a strong security
framework and promote the stability for CEEs to develop into stable democracies
and market economies. NATO cannot wait until the EU is ready to expand.209
Before the first round, NATO members began to make their own assessment
for future members. Waiting to be discussed in Madrid summit which
country/countries to invite, the U.S. favoured a small intake in the first enlargement
round, including only Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary. On the other hand,
Canada supported a wide enlargement to include these states, as well as Slovenia,
Romania, and Slovakia, with a view to developing a broad transatlantic community.
France, along with Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Turkey promoted a "southern
enlargement" to balance the "eastern enlargement" by taking in Romania, Bulgaria
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and Slovenia.210 French argued that NATO should worry about the Mediterranean
and the Balkans as well as CEE.211
However, NATO has also set some basic criteria for membership. These are
being a stable democracy, having civilian control of armed forces, possessing enough
military capacity to contribute meaningfully not simply to one’s own defense but
also to collective security, and having no active disputes within or on one’s borders.
Furthermore, in order for a country to qualify for inclusion into NATO it must have
fair treatment of its minorities, healthy civil-military relations, and be free of border
disputes with its neighbors.212 It is under these fundamental views that Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic received invitations to join NATO when leaders held a
summit at Madrid in July 1997. NATO welcomed them into the alliance in 1999
Washington summit.213
4.2. Arguments Related to the Expansion of NATO Membership
Some observers saw the expansion of the alliance to include three former
members of the WTO as the epochal event to mark the end of the Cold War in
Europe. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called the decision "historic," and "an
essential part of a broader strategy to build an undivided, democratic, and peaceful
Europe".214 Henry Kissinger wrote, "The Clinton Administration should be
applauded for braving both domestic and Russian opposition in urging the admission
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of new members into NATO".215 At the same time, George Kennan did not keep
back words in his opposition to the expansion. He claimed that expanding NATO
would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.216
The influential foreign policy analyst of U.S., Michael Mandelbaum predicted that
membership expansion would be a bridge to the nineteenth century as a tradition
featuring great power rivalry, shifting alliances, and continuing concern with an
unregulated military balance.217
Theories of security institutions generally start with the assumption that states
want to maximize their security at minimum cost and with the minimum necessary
damage to their autonomy.218 As an alliance defined in defensive terms, NATO's
central task has been one of protecting the sovereignty of individual member states.
Subsequently alliance and security practice has involved the drawing of clear
boundaries, specifying whom to protect by the security guarantee and whom to leave
outside.219 The current challenge is to expand without reviving Cold War tensions or
recreating a division of Europe. The purpose of the security organisations is now
being defined less in terms of defence than providing an anchor of stability. This
raises fundamental questions about the meaning of security and NATO's identity as a
security organisation.220 A lively political and academic debate over NATO
expansion has tended to revolve around the question of whether this move eastward
will recreate the division of Europe or bring greater peace and stability to a
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fragmented region.221 Accordingly, all the proponents and opponents forwarded their
arguments as whether NATO should enlarge or not. At such a high level of
abstraction, major theoretical traditions in international relations seem to give
inconsistent arguments about NATO’s future.
Classical Realists could be found both prescribing and predicting NATO
expansion as an insurance policy against future threats222 and Neorealists prescribing
and predicting the dissolution of NATO as an alliance without a shared enemy.223
Some institutionalists saw NATO as an essential part of a persistent regime224, others
looked to different or new institutional settings in which European security ought to
be or would be managed.225 Some Constructivists accepted NATO enlargement a
natural and inherently progressive outgrowth of NATO's essential identity as a
pluralistic democratic security community and as international socialization.226
Many advocates of membership enlargement wanted to see NATO as a
security community. It makes sense to admit states based on their democratic
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standing, how their governments and armies behave, how they expressed Western or
democratic values.227 Many opponents wanted to see NATO as an alliance. In that
case it would make sense to admit states on the basis of concrete security interests,
territories that are critically important for existing NATO states, or that could make a
valuable contribution to NATO’s own protection. Alliances do not strengthen
themselves by including weak, dependent, and vulnerable new states.228
Table 3 229
The alliance and the security community differ obviously within the context
of promises to create a unified theoretical perspective that can highlight the logical
differences between them.
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4.2.1. Arguments in Support of Membership Enlargement
NATO's enlargement process helps to prevent major conflicts in Europe,
because the prospect of NATO membership serves as an incentive for aspirants to set
up bilateral treaties, to resolve border disputes, to resolve minority issues, and to
establish proper democratic reforms and democratic control over militaries. The
MAP countries like Slovenia, began to use this opportunity to build a new
government from the ground up.230
The process of application encourages states to get their domestic affairs in
order, which in turn strengthens the overall stability of the region. Furthermore, by
keeping an open door policy as to extend further memberships, NATO encourages
additional states to become more democratic, thus creating a more stable political
and security environment in Europe.231 Enlargement will gradually end old Cold-War
understandings in Europe and bring new members into an integrated Euro-Atlantic
community. Although expansion of the EU is important for encouraging stability,
integration of CEE countries fully, will take at least a couple of decades. Thus,
NATO enlargement will further secure the transatlantic link that many European
states wish to preserve and extend.232
Some advocates of enlarging NATO, particularly CEE leaders for whom the
Soviets' iron grip is a recent memory, stress the extension of the alliance's traditional
deterrent function. Collective defense remains the core of the alliance. Extending it
to qualified new members will deter aggression in a traditionally unstable region.
They also argue that membership in NATO would stabilize the region by filling the
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power vacuum and eliminating the need for security competition, because Russia
will not reconquer its former empire. Accordingly, membership enlargement will
prevent the "renationalization" of defense in central Europe. Each new member need
develop only that part of its military that serves overall alliance purposes, and will
benefit from a NATO military infrastructure linking it to countries committed to
collective defense. 233
 CEE, as a traditionally volatile area, is widespread with potential irredentist
and ethnic conflicts, and NATO can help arbitrate and limit these disputes.234
Furthermore, certain aspects of NATO can help moderate the rivalries within the
region after enlarging its membership with CEE countries.235 First, NATO ensures
that member states' leaders meet regularly. When such meetings are necessary to
defuse tensions, yet politically impossible to arrange bilaterally, NATO usefully
supplies a face-saving forum in which statesmen can move beyond rhetoric. Second,
the alliance powerfully influences the rivals indirectly, through the regular
interaction of military officers, who gain greater understanding of their respective
interests and perceptions. Third, the membership in the alliance provides the US with
a measure of influence over their behavior. Thus, advocates of NATO enlargement
believe that the initiative will bring peace to East-Central Europe just as the alliance
did to France and Germany. NATO, they assert, will prevent steaming tensions in the
region from "bubbling over".
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The enlargement process brings a larger circle of like-minded states together
to contribute to collective security and collective defense. The proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a very important issue for Europe. Because it
is not an issue developing over time, but where the technical development can move
very quickly based upon the import of technologies and the delivery of missile
systems. Such cooperation can be seen in consensus for prevention of WMD
proliferation and in Bosnia and Kosovo where NATO plus all of the PfP countries
are participating to maintain and keep peace and security.236
CEE leaders often portray NATO as merely a stepping-stone to the EU,
arguing that alliance membership will send a welcome signal to financial markets
and investors. The plenoprosperity will be established in a way when CEE countries
join NATO. They will have a more stable climate for investment and economic
reform. A large investor would certainly think about putting money into any of these
countries coming into NATO, because clearly their investment risk is going to go
down. Indeed, more countries and companies are going to be willing to put money
into countries that are part of NATO thanks to the security guarantees that the
Alliance supposes. Moreover, clearly, those investments will be a boost to their
chances for wider integration with the West.237
NATO as an organization is comprised of a huge bureaucracy in place in
Brussels. Whether it is domestic or international, an agency or a bureaucracy created
to do a certain job is not easily gotten rid of the agency, or the bureaucracy, even
after the job is long ago accomplished. It hangs on forever and ever. One cannot give
orders and disband the alliance. Although there exists no more job of the kind that is
accustomed to the organization begins to create new ones. This brings a new
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dynamism to the structure and mission of the organization.238 NATO needs to
enlarge for it to survive. "Not to enlarge is the do-nothing option, achieve nothing
option," this means accepting to disband, in the view of Secretary General Javier
Solana, "it is the option the Alliance long ago rejected".239
NATO's membership enlargement will maintain and strengthen the role and
effectiveness of NATO against a separate European Security and Defence Identity
(ESDI). As the situation and NATO troops in Bosnia and Kosovo make very clear,
defense issues remain for Euro-Atlantic states to address. Furthermore, despite being
at the far end of the conflict spectrum envisaged in threat assessments, the Gulf War
demonstrated that there are also places outside of Europe where the U.S. and Europe
can act together in defense of Western interests.240 Meanwhile, a separate ESDI
based on calculations of self-interest on part of EU member NATO members, risks
NATO to become a European tool. In this context, by covering a larger part of
Europe than EU, the effectiveness of the NATO alliance and ultimately its future will
be increasingly saved from becoming a tool for European interests alone.241
While securing the future of the alliance, an enlargement of NATO would
also call for an upgrading of the role of the European institutions such as OSCE. For
instance, many of the interests of OSCE’s participating states are related to the
Alliance. This means that maintaining or even strengthening the role of NATO in
European security could also enhance the interests of the participating states in
OSCE. A strong and relevant Alliance coupled with a decisive leadership provided
by a member state could provide better grounds for OSCE’s role in European
security and could better keep up the motivations of various states to make use of
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OSCE. The best way to ensure an enhanced role and credibility of OSCE is to find a
new relevance for the Atlantic Alliance, to have NATO address the security concerns
of its partners, and to proceed with its enlargement242
Moreover, regarding the yet immature ESDP, the Atlantic Alliance provides a
useful alternative of defining and coordinating national interests instead of
attempting to coordinate security policy cooperation on the basis of unspecified
common European interests. With the enlargement of NATO, a EU smaller than
NATO but fully covered by it would have no major problems in developing an ESDI,
which could easily serve as the European pillar of the Alliance. In the case of a
NATO covering a larger area than the EU the problem of “backdoor guarantees”
would be solved. The members of the WEU (who are also members of the EU and
NATO) could decide to include the new members of the EU without the danger of
“covertly” extending to them the NATO (and ultimately the U.S.) security guarantee,
because these new members would anyhow be covered by these commitments. In
that case, there would be no institutional obstacle before implementing the ambitions
for a common ESDI.243
Yalta treated the CEE countries unfairly, they suffered for more than forty-
five years under Soviet domination, these nations now wish to rejoin the West, and
the West, therefore, has a moral obligation to these nations. Membership
enlargement is a noble democratizing mission that NATO should undertake, and the
Western public will understand and support such a mission. CEE governments argue
that anything short of NATO membership would unwittingly remind this old division
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and ratify a new division of Europe, exclude them from determining their strategic
fate, and be untrue to Western values. The best time to extend NATO's reach before a
new threat emerged is now. Furthermore, since the major Western governments have
approved the idea of enlargement it is wiser to proceed than to cause the Alliance to
lose credibility and confidence by publicly failing at its major post-Cold War policy
initiative.244
Closely related to this argument is the "sense of belonging" which overlaps
the identity problematic of these CEE countries. Any decision to refrain from taking
in new members may cause the CEEs to begin questioning their identity vis-à-vis
Europe that once they felt to belong. This can lead even their questioning the
appropriateness of their move, while destroying the learning process that is achieved
throughout the process of membership enlargement. Regarding the membership of
NATO, the aspirant countries and also the original members see admission as the
legitimization of their Western identity and social and political values.245
There is another, related justification that NATO’s enlargement serves as a
hedge against the possibility that Russia will reemerge as an authoritarian country
prone to adventurism beyond its borders and the use of military force. According to
this logic, enlargement will secure for the alliance a significant presence in a
strategically important area, thereby limiting Moscow's potential sphere of influence.
NATO enlargement should be done with Moscow's cooperation if possible and in the
face of Moscow's opposition if necessary. If Moscow strongly opposes this NATO
initiative, enlarging quickly is better for the Alliance, both to show Russia that this
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matter is settled and to do so before Russia becomes stronger and able to endanger
the outcome.246
In accordance with balance-of-threat theory, the call for extending full
membership to a group of CEE countries needs to be encouraged. 247 It is argued that
NATO is and its enlargement would be still needed “to reassure Germany that it need
not arm itself more heavily to remain secure, something that would make Germany’s
neighbors feel less secure.”248 It is also argued that the need to respond to an
imminent Russian threat is a minor driving motive for NATO expansion but to
forestall even a hint of an independent German foreign policy in the east.249 NATO
expansion is essentially the adaptation of a politically familiar vehicle to the task of
preserving U.S. primacy.250
The defense industries and their economies will also benefit by securing
markets for their armaments in the newly allied states. NATO's membership
enlargement will create an arms bazaar in a way not with an incentive to counter an
opponent but to establish the standardization of inventories on a defensive basis.251
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4.2.2. Arguments Against Membership Enlargement
Among numerous arguments, the one based on the adequacy of PfP should
come first. In terms of this argument, PfP provides a more than adequate vehicle for
extending a degree of military security and stability to the countries of CEE.252 For
that reason, enlarging NATO's membership would be unnecessary.
The alliance's leaders contend that bringing in CEE states will promote
stability and democracy in the region, but none of the leading candidates for NATO
membership has internal stability problems; indeed, this is a condition for
membership. The CEE states having domestic problems, such as Albania, Macedonia
and Slovakia, have been dropped to the bottom of the list of applicants. In any event,
NATO, which is fundamentally a military organization, is not well equipped to help
new members promote political stability, advance democratic reform, and address
ethnic problems. Furthermore, some argue that even the NATO membership may fail
to stabilize a historically volatile area.253 First, NATO membership may externalize
these small CEE states' security, encouraging them to make a shift in foreign policy
focus from the main threat (Russia) to regional interests, and prompting the
emergence of the conflict. Second, alliance arms transfers may help transform the
limited disputes of existing historical problems into a broader and deeper enmity.
Third, in the context of deteriorating relationships, those features of the Alliance
theoretically conducive to cooperation may fail to achieve that end. The transparency
of capabilities fostered by the alliance would not sufficiently calm decision-makers
anxious about the other's motives. The issue linkages it supplied may prove
inadequate in negotiating a compromise, but rather help to broaden the conflict as
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parties seek bargaining leverage. Even the alliance itself, its forums and its other
benefits, may become an object of contest.
Some strategists think that NATO enlargement as coalitions of military forces
to maintain security will become far less effective in a world where poverty,
economic corruption, pollution, refugee movements, drug trafficking, ethnic strife,
shortages of water and arable land, weapons proliferation, terrorism and illegal trade
in chemical and biological weapons are emerging as key threats.254 Military force
embedded in NATO may be the wrong tool for shaping the future of Euro-Atlantic
environment. The economics has truly overtaken military security, as the force
shaping Europe today, then there is no need for expanding NATO. As a military
alliance, it dares not expand to protect the countries that most need protection. As an
economic alliance, the EU and other trade blocs would logically overtake its role. In
the post-Cold-War era, securing European stability should be left to political
institutions, such as the EU, and not to NATO. CEE's true needs are strong economic
structures and democratic institutions. These, however, are not NATO functions and
the EU can do more to contribute to CEE. EU countries are wealthy, and can well
afford the costs of stabilizing their eastern neighbors.255
NATO expansion could also cause serious problems in the alliance's relations
with Russia. The key Western interest in Europe is ensuring Russia's continued
democratization and integration into the community of nations, since neither NATO
nor regional states can effectively maintain security and stability without Russian
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cooperation.256 However, membership enlargement will humiliate Moscow and make
Russia vulnerable to Russian nationalists hostile to U.S. and Europe, who believe
that the country's interests are being sacrificed by weak leadership. After the first
round, Russian nationalists and political opportunists have another weapon to use
against pro-Western factions in Russia's domestic political arena. The worst-case
scenario is that embittered nationalists or opportunists will come to power and adopt
hardly cooperative and much more aggressive policies toward Europe and the U.S. in
turn redividing Europe in the process.257
Meanwhile, because of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
(CFE) and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the conventional balance in Europe has
dramatically shifted. NATO forces now outnumber Russia's three to one. Adding
new members to NATO will only increase the inequity and with it Russia's reliance
on its nuclear arsenal and render this conventional superiority useless. Treating
Moscow as a foe that must be contained undermines the task to address the danger
posed by the large U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles. There is a dilemma of which
to choose; a status quo NATO and arms control, or a larger NATO and no arms
accord. Furthermore, before the first round of membership enlargement, decision for
renegotiation of CFE, as part of an unspoken deal on enlargement between U.S. and
Russia, has now proved too generous towards Russia and thereby made the political
and military cost of enlargement too high.258 Moreover, the promise not to deploy
nuclear forces in the territory of new members that has been made to Russia with the
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NATO-Russia Founding Act is a potential controversial point among the members.
NATO declared that it will not in the foreseeable future station nuclear weapons on
new members' soil, but that it may do so should the need arise.259 However, the
establishment of a NWFZ in CEE, along with the elimination of tactical nuclear
weapons from CEE region sees to serve as an assurance to Russia that NATO's
enlargement will not be a threat to her.260 Furthermore, Denmark, Iceland, Norway,
and Spain have non-nuclear peacetime status in NATO.261 All the same, NATO's
level of flexibility for the demands of this kind, while some NATO membership
aspirant CEE and Black Sea countries favor such an idea, is a matter of potential
controversy in NATO. Such an action also bears substantial risks for some NATO
members as to remain the only immediate nuclear target.262
On the other hand, CEE leaders act as if there is little chance that the mutual
defense promises embodied in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty would ever be
implemented. They insist that only the wording of those security commitments will
deter aggression and enhance the stability of the region. Enlargement based on such
an assumption is little more than an irresponsible bluff that Russia, given its
extensive political, economic, and security interests in CEE, might in the future be
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tempted to call. The only way to minimize the likelihood of such a challenge would
be to deploy robust NATO forces in the vulnerable front-line states as to increase the
tensions.263
Supporting the above argument, membership enlargement will dilute the
alliance by complicating decision-making, and admitting countries without
established traditions of democratic practices and civilian control of the military. The
candidates are too small to contribute meaningfully to alliance missions, particularly
the mission of collective defense. Increasing the number of NATO members risks
diluting the alliance and the credibility of its Article 5 commitment in which every
member state pledges to come to the defense of every other one. At some point,
NATO becomes so large and diverse that it becomes more a political association than
a military organization, a grouping of states whose commitments are more
declaratory than real.264
Moreover, there is no threat to any current ally or candidate state, and no need
to expand NATO's collective defense commitments. Membership enlargement will
create new dividing lines in Europe by putting Russia on guard against an alliance
moving into its traditional areas of influence. Not inviting such countries as the
Baltic states and Romania to join the alliance signals Moscow that they are isolated
and subject to its influence.265
NATO enlargement process bears also risks for NATO itself. Pushing NATO
to bring in new members before EU takes any step forward, NATO takes on the EU's
burdens and obligations on a variety of fields from democracy to technology. This
will apparently overburden NATO. Crisis management, peacekeeping, and NATO's
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other "new missions" will make of the alliance a collective security organization,
where political rather than military functions predominate. Furthermore, the EU
could expand in the future, thereby extending additional political and economic
support to these same CEE countries. The decision to enlarge NATO is thus both
unfortunate and unnecessary not only for material reasons but also for moral
reasons.266 The decision to extend membership without reasonable grounds may
simply cause the original members to question their own values, norms, and identity.
Thus, there is also the risk of creating divisions within individual NATO members.267
The centrality of the U.S. within NATO creates a problem for Russia.
Nevertheless, the EU expansion would be perceived as less threatening by Russia. It
would also force Europeans to address some important security problems that are
basically European responsibilities. NATO's expanding before the EU takes further
steps towards enlargement poses a serious risk to the Alliance. 268
NATO enlargement will be expensive, not only on the part of the newcomers
but also for the original NATO members. The allies show no willingness to share the
costs. The military requirements that would follow from the first round of NATO
expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been estimated to cost a
total of at least $27 billion to $35 billion by 2010. Although the estimates may prove
imprecise the actual cost could be twice this amount or even higher. NATO
enlargement will also hit both potential and current NATO nations where they are
vulnerable, economy. Aspirants are looking to buy U.S. or Western military
armament and equipment. These countries expect that this would facilitate
membership. However, they could buy only a little portion of what they want with
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the money allocated in their defense budget for importing military armament and
equipment. In any case, the U.S. share will be one-third or more of the ultimate
figure. The Administration has estimated a cost of $27-35 billion over 12 years.
Some other estimates are even higher depending upon the level of threat projected.
Bosnia demonstrates that the Europeans are not willing to bear the burden for
ensuring security in their own backyard. If instability develops in central Europe, the
U.S. will have to shoulder the financial and military costs of bringing peace. The
need for internal reform to achieve greater military burden sharing in NATO is
another reason why NATO enlargement is a bad idea. Transforming NATO should
be a higher priority than expanding it.269
4.3. After the First Round of Membership Enlargement
Since the early 1990s' unprecedented changes has taken place in NATO
thinking and strategy. NATO extended from a 16-member-strong Western alliance
targeted against the Soviet Union to an alliance of 19 democracies set on further
enlargement and reoriented to new threats against Western interests.270 Today, the
debate that preceded the first enlargement is expected to resurface, as questions about
the alliance's future course and membership become more salient.271 On the other
hand, the rationale created among the allies during the long run-up to the Madrid
summit and later the Washington summit continues to make sense even today.
NATO accepts that European security is no longer premised on a known threat or
geopolitical calculation that presumes a line of potential confrontation. Thus NATO's
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goal is to become an encompassing institution without predetermined limits. It also
transforms itself from a collective defense organization to a collective security
organization, provided that aspirants can meet the rigorous membership requirements
and the alliance can maintain its strength and purpose.272
After the 50th anniversary summit, accomplished the first round of
membership enlargement, NATO's first concern became to determine if it has the
military capacity to meet its new commitments. It launched a Defense Capabilities
Initiative (DCI) to improve interoperability not only among NATO forces but also
between NATO and partner forces. After the Washington summit, NATO began
developing an Operational Capability Concept (OCC) that should help to engage
partners and members in future military operations by identifying national or
multinational forces that can be used in non-Article 5 activities. The OCC will result
in a pool of forces that can augment NATO forces.273 However, there is hardly any
consensus on this "capabilities" point among the members. The US planned that
allies must bolster their ability to project military power. Britain asserted to have
achieved this goal that new commitments are covered by capabilities to meet existing
requirements. Other allies, including France and Germany, argued that they are
already prepared to meet foreseeable contingencies, while some smaller allies have
actually decreased their defense spending and force level. The only exception of this
tendency are Turkey, Greece, and U.K.274 Certainly, if NATO's new roles and
commitments are to be taken seriously, each ally must make its military contribution
as the price of having an alliance in practice as well as on paper.
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In NATO's Washington summit, determined to reaffirm the principles of
Madrid and to advance further the process of enlargement, NATO's 19 leaders also
approved a Membership Action Plan (MAP).275 The MAP is a practical
manifestation of the NATO's Article 10, open door policy. The MAP Annual
National Plan (ANPs) generated by each partner allows each to set their own
objectives and targets on preparations for possible future membership. The MAP is
available to all declared aspirants on the basis of self-selection. Nine of NATO's
current partners have declared their candidacy for future membership, including
Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia. 276
Figure 7: NATO Membership Applicants for the 2nd Round277
Key elements of the MAP include:
• ANPs covering political, economic, defense, resource, security and legal aspects
of preparing for membership;
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• a feedback mechanism on progress that includes both political and technical
advice, as well as annual assessments by the NAC;
• a means for coordinating security assistance by NATO and by member states;
• enhanced defense planning that includes establishment and review of agreed
planning targets specifically tailored to prepare aspirant militaries for possible
future membership.
As it is premature now to consider which set of countries will next be invited
to join the alliance, the choices around which all 19 allies could easily coalesce have
already in place. Those have been affirmed in the period from 1995 to 1999 during
the first enlargement wave.278 The risk now is that allies will divide along regional
lines, opting for candidates near them geographically while ignoring those farther
away. So far the Nordic allies and Poland have shown interest in having the three
Baltic states admitted, and the southern allies have chosen Slovenia, Romania, and
Bulgaria for early entry, but there is little cross-support. Britain would likely be
content with an indefinite pause, and Germany has gained the new allies it needs.
The politics of the alliance will likely dictate a balanced package, drawing on both
the Baltic and the Balkans with consideration of Slovakia, under its new democratic
government, and Austria, if it applies. Most important, the allies must use the period
ahead to build broad support for a workable approach to enlargement. As earlier
commitments, it is important that NATO consider each aspirant individually, on its
own merits; exclude no central European country, and although there may be military
merit in choosing countries contiguous to NATO territory, not limit enlargement to
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geography.279 Above all, one concern for further membership enlargement has
apparent and broad support of prominent NATO and U.S. officials that any nation
that comes into the alliance must bring in capability.280
However, most of the Western European allies and accordingly NATO itself
seem to not really want further enlargement in the near future, and certainly not until
2003.281 All the same, prudence for a careful approach to membership enlargement
calls time to integrate Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This provision
centers on whether allies are able and willing to defend new members under
challenge, whether they will underpin the domestic political and economic
development of new entrants, and whether a much larger alliance can continue to
take decisions and act on them.282
Today, the impact of NATO enlargement, even though no serious reaction
took place after the first round, on Russia remains the biggest unknown and the most
significant element in the NATO expansion equation. The potential impact on
relations with Russia will play out in arms control and diplomatic relations.283
Adding members to NATO will endanger the current arms control accords and do
nothing to protect West from the real threat of weapons of mass destruction. It is
going to be increasingly difficult to obtain Russian cooperation in securing this
material if NATO and Western actions are interpreted as attempts to exploit Russia's
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current weakness, as they are by most Russian officials.284 Another consequence of
NATO expansion is that it has decreased diplomatic cooperation with Russia.
Moscow would disagree with the West on some issues of great importance. It is
nevertheless crucial to maintain the best relations possible. Russia's influence can
significantly aid or hamper efforts in many areas of the world. For example, without
Moscow's cooperation, the UN Security Council will be unable to make decisions. In
1991, Russia's cooperation paved the way for creation of the Gulf War coalition
whose actions were endorsed overwhelmingly by the UN Security Council. Since
then, not only did Moscow not consent to U.S. military action against Iraq, it also
seemed to be intent on preventing any reconstitution of a major anti-Iraq coalition
under U.S. leadership. Apparently, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the PJC
proved inadequate. Furthermore, the Russian action in Kosovo is evidence of how
serious a future Russian reaction may be.285 The willingness of the Russians to work
with the U.S. and Europe will decrease further if its legislature and its people believe
that Washington and Brussels are taking advantage of Russia's current diplomatic,
economic, and conventional military weakness. 286
NATO's membership enlargement along with the general idea of a new
strategic concept was the centerpieces of the 1999 summit. Although a decisive
second round could have been initiated, the allies kept from declaration of any kind.
Kosovo crisis knocked them off the front page and took out of enlargement some of
the momentum, some of the urgency as to keep the issue in 34th place even in May
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2000 NATO Ministerial in Florence.287 On the other hand, the war in Kosovo made
accession of some CEE countries more important, more appropriate regarding their
assistance at the time of crisis. The Kosovo crisis proved harmful to enlargement in
some ways. First, the fact that NATO has grown from 16 to 19 increased the strength
of the dilution argument. NATO has difficulty at hard times in agreeing on a course
of action, either as a reflection of a lack of American leadership or else. The first
round of expansion exacerbates the problem. So the idea of going from 19 to 20 or
21 is clearly put on the defensive. Second, the fact that Russia clearly opposes
enlargement worries the advocates of an early second round. So suddenly
enlargement no longer seemed quite as central as it did and its momentum has
slowed down.288 Furthermore, to some NATO officers at SHAPE it would be
appropriate to stop taking on additional members until NATO strikes an inner
balance in 10 to 15 years.289 In a press release early this year, President Bush
promised to "advance the process of NATO enlargement" at the next NATO summit
in 2002. After all, advancing of NATO enlargement by 2002 does not necessarily
mean expanding the alliance at that time, and it is not only a U.S. president's
decision; the other 18 NATO allies must also give their consent. Moreover, after the
Kosovo war, there is less enthusiasm in the U.S., as well as in Europe, to add more
members to what has proved to be an often-divided alliance.290
Beyond these concerns there may be strategic benefits of NATO enlargement.
NATO membership helps countries in transition to make the right choices when it
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comes to democracy and modernization. The latest example is that of NATO's three
new members, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. They were emerging from
difficult periods of transition, and were making strong efforts to integrate with the
Euro-Atlantic community while NATO responded by offering membership. This
reinforced their reforms as a direct contribution to security in Europe. Furthermore,
NATO's willingness to open its doors has brought Europe closer together in spirit
and in practice. This is a reason why NATO remains so healthy today.291
Nevertheless, U.S. Secretary of Defense declares that NATO will be in the
future what it was in the past, the bulwark for security, peace and freedom on the
Eurasian landmass, and something that Russia will have to deal with. He also asserts
that there is no prioritization of the nine MAP countries at this time. On the other
hand, NATO enlargement is a key part of the process of uniting all of Europe and the
decision to invite in qualified new members will be among the most serious
challenges the Alliance could have.292 As NATO approaches the Prague Summit of
2002, the challenge is coming to some judgement within the alliance as to the
standards wanted those nine countries to meet before considering their admission
into NATO. Moreover, a unique set of sensitivities with the Baltic states in
particular, and Russia in general, with the probable path of the second round of
enlargement will be discussed in the upcoming NATO meetings of the spring and
summer 2001. Surely without any veto on the part of Russia as to whether new
members come in or not, despite her say via PJC and NATO-Russia Founding Act.
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The decision on accession may be made at the NATO summit in the fall of 2002 in
Prague.293
4.4. Turkey and NATO's Membership Enlargement 294
At the end of the Cold War, after a period of hesitation, the risks springing
from the instability put the NATO enlargement high on the agenda of West European
NATO members. They approved or not, the European allies rushed to deal with the
issue in order to cap or continue with it according to their own calculations. They did
not want to be involved in crises of a volatile area because of some other's
interests.295 On the other hand, Turkey was already part of a proposal to establish
stability in the region before membership enlargement became the issue, and it was
not very high on her agenda.296 However, the establishment of stability alone is of
utmost importance why Turkey should support membership enlargement to its
immediate west. Accordingly, the official Turkish position was declared as pro-
enlargement with Foreign Minister İsmail Cem's declaration in Brussels as "the
government has committed itself to NATO Expansion, and that is our position".297
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However, when the enlargement process advanced, Turkey acted cautiously about
membership enlargement for several reasons.298
The first reason is the linkage Ankara has established between NATO and the
EU as well as its defence organisation, the WEU. When Tansu Çiller was the Foreign
Minister in the Erbakan Government, even before the Luxembourg disappointment,
she was the first to declare such a linkage between accession to NATO and the EU
and WEU memberships.299 Arguably, it was NATO itself that first established such a
linkage in the official "Study on NATO Enlargement" document of September
1995.300 Indeed, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are in the first round in
both and Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania are
the membership candidates of both organizations. There are Albania and Macedonia
on NATO's part, which because of Turkey’s influence in the Alliance became MAP
members. Further complicating the matters for Turkish side is that the CEE countries
most likely to join NATO would be ahead of Turkey on the EU membership. Ankara
was concerned that CEE states may enter the EU by 2002/03, prior to Turkey.
Mainly because, Turkey will certainly be called for defence of these countries in case
they become involved in an Article 5 crisis while it will probably not be granted the
equal status as a trading or political partner within the same environment.301 In other
words, the parallel drawn between the NATO and EU enlargements is not Turkey’s
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invention, but a fact, and the difficulty Turkey is encountering in one is inducing it to
slow motion in the other organisation in which it has a weighty role and influence.302
The second and more important reason for the slow ratification is Turkey’s
wish to see Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Slovakia within NATO along with the
other three CEE countries. This is because the Balkan countries face a bigger threat
than Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. While the CEE states are given
priority in NATO enlargement, due to certain calculations of balances of power
among the big NATO members, Turkey’s neighbours are neglected. However, the
Balkans are more the scene of subversion, racism, and racial cleansing activities than
CEE, as evidenced by the events and even war crimes, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Kosovo and the unrest and internal conflicts in Albania and Macedonia. Furthermore,
it is clear that the Balkans becomes more and more part of Europe looking at the
direction NATO is going in terms of its missions and policies. The Balkans occupy a
vital strategic position in the new Europe.303 The eastern border of NATO now runs
from Poland's east, through the Czech Republic, to Hungary's. The Balkans,
however, pierce NATO's southeastern flank between the new members and the old
members of NATO, Greece and Turkey. Serbia itself remains a zone of Russian
influence in conformity with the classical realist arguments in favor of NATO's
membership enlargement, the necessity of demonstrating the ability to dominate this
area militarily is crucial to the expansion of NATO.304
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Moreover, from Turkish point of view the importance of a second round of
membership enlargement to the area is crystallized because it provides a major
contribution to the geostrategic continuity of NATO.305 If the stability is the
objective, then the Balkans should certainly be included in enlargement process.306
The third and most important reason is the changed nature and structure of
threat, after the downfall of the WP and the S.U. Turkey believes that the threat is
now proliferation of WMD, nuclear smuggling, and terrorism. However, these
threats seem far to European members.307 Curiously, as NATO goes more out-of-area
with more peacekeeping and more peace support, with more involvement in the
proliferation of WMD problem and terrorism problem, NATO will be focused on
Turkish strategic environment. Actually, these out-of-area activities are much more
likely to be done in the proximity of Turkey than on the Polish border. The Balkans,
the Caucasus and the Middle East are the leading areas of security consumption
today. After all, even focusing on the traditional Article 5 (defense of territory)
missions, NATO engagement in the region will probably take place on Turkey's
eastern and southern borders.308
On the other hand, there is the issue of establishment of a Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone (NWFZ) in CEE by refraining from deploying nuclear weapons on the
territory of new members. In order to reassure Russia that NATO enlargement will
not be a threat to her, proposals about creating a non-nuclear in CEE have been
made. This will clear NATO's nuclear peacetime presence in CEE while keeping the
ones in Turkey at place.309 Turkey's concerns on national security about the Russian
                                                          
305 See Ali Karaosmanoğlu, op. cit., p. 214
306 Ibid.
307 See Mustafa Kibaroğlu, "Turkey", op. cit., pp. 162-166, and also see M. Kibaroğlu, "The General's
Discontent", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2001, p. 29
308 Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser, F. Stephen Larrabee, “The Future of Turkish-Western Relations:
Toward A Strategic Plan”, RAND, pp. 1-4, at: http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241
309 See W. C. Potter, "Unsafe at any size", op. cit., p. 14
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National Strategic Concept of December 1999, and also WMD threat to its
immediate neighborhood keeps it from demanding a non-nuclear position in NATO.
However, this makes Turkey bear more risks and more responsibilities than the other
and new NATO members which is against the principles of collective defense.310
Turkey has also concerns of being overlooked, like Norway and Iceland,
because of its exclusion from the ESDP decision-making mechanism while it has an
exposed strategic position as an important flank country for the defense of Europe.311
Moreover, Ankara fears that the membership enlargement to CEE or Baltics along
with the formation of an ESDI within NATO will shrink the importance of Southern
Flank of NATO and inevitably of Turkey.312 An early accession before Turkey of
new NATO members to EU will naturally make them full ESDP participants while
Turkey is not granted such a status. This will move limited resources to new
European allies that could otherwise be useful to Turkey, and exclude Turkey from
taking part in decisions of utmost importance for its regional interests as it confronts
a number of significant internal and external crises and risks. From this perspective,
still little incentive counts for Turkey to support new NATO members in CEE unless
granted closer ties with the ESDP.313 There is also the concern that as NATO evolves
from an organization charged with defence of territory to an instrument of collective
security and crisis management, Turkey's weight in the alliance will correspondingly
diminish.314
                                                          
310 See M. Kibaroğlu, "Turkey", op. cit., pp. 188-189
311 See Alyson Bailes, "Europe's Defense Challenge", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, Is. 1, Jan. 1997, p. 14
312 Parliamentarian Kamran İnan mentioned the possibility of reducing the significance of the
Southern Flank by expanding NATO's frontiers during the ratification discussions of enlargement in
TGNA Foreign Relations Commission, April 1998, cited in Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney, "NATO's
Enlargement and Turkey", Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, Annual, 1998/1999, Is. 4, p. 171
313 See Ali Karaosmanoğlu, op. cit., p. 215, and also Hall Gardner, "NATO Enlargement: Toward A
Separate Euro-Atlantic Command", American University of Paris, January 30, 1999, available at:
http://search.cetin.net.cn/internet/DSTI/FAS/man/nato/ceern/hallga2.htm
314 See Lionel Barber, "A Vital Interest for the EU", Europe, Is. 367, June 1997, p. 26
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Despite all these problems, Turkey continues its pro-enlargement policy.
Turkish Grand National Assembly has ratified the protocols of NATO's first
membership enlargement round on 21st of October in 1998. Turkey is the last NATO
member who ratified the protocols before Norway. Actually, Turkey has officially
declared its support for Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Baltic states,
Albania and Macedonia in their desire to become NATO members.315
                                                          
315 The most assuring events are President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's and FM İsmail Cem's declarations on
several bilateral or multilateral conventions or visits. See, for example, "Bulgaria and Romania seeks
Turkey's backing for NATO", Reuters, Report on a Trilateral Summit of Heads of States, Plovdiv,
Bulgaria, February 15, 2001, and "Turkey Says Backs Baltic and Balkan Expansion", Estonian
Review, Vol. 10, Is. 23, June 11, 2000, available at: http://www.vm.ee/eng/review/2000/review23.htm,
and also "Turkish Foreign Minister Arrives In Slovenia", Slovene News Agency, April 19, 2001, at:
http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=010419004589
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Figure 8: NATO Today
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CHAPTER 5
5. CONCLUSION
The NATO alliance remains the center of European security debates. It was
successful, both during and after the Cold War. It accomplished a series of
transformations and adaptation processes in its central tasks of building political
consensus, managing threats, defending its member states, capably organizing
multinational military operations, and keeping the only remaining superpower, the
U.S., involved in Europe. This transformation process has redefined the approaches
to the meaning of alliances as NATO introduced novelties in its scope of
preservation of peace, security, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The
geographical enlargement of NATO, in the post-cold war era, is the centerpiece of
this whole transformation process. With regard to its implications, after the first
round of membership enlargement and enlargement through partnership, the
incorporation of new members into NATO did not affect its tasks and the alliance's
ability to successfully conduct them. The usefulness of a second round of
enlargement, however, should also be considered from the perspective of its possible
impact on Russian-NATO relations as well as on ESDP-NATO posture.
It has so far been reasonable to argue that NATO's enlargement on the whole,
has been successful. Primarily, it has brought NATO the dynamism it needed to
survive. Today, NATO is defined in terms of an alliance that has more functions than
the mere collective defense. Especially regarding the mission of promoting stability
in a traditionally volatile area, the enlargement through partnership seems more
successful towards the establishment of a security community. On the other hand,
membership enlargement, with the objective of creating a successful Euro-Atlantic
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collective security organization, has served to sustain the credibility of NATO. Apart
from Article 5 commitments extended to new members, the "security commitment"
embedded in PfP through Article 4 consultation availability has served the creation
of a stable environment at least on interstate level among 46 states. Moreover, with
the values and norms it represents, the idea of NATO membership has encouraged all
of CEE countries to acquire democratic principles, put up democratic institutions,
and to develop as peaceful members of the international community.
From Turkey's perspective, NATO's first round of membership enlargement
serves merely as a means to reestablish close relations with new members within the
same alliance. Arguably, however, the first round did not contribute to Turkey's
regional security concerns to a great extent. Nevertheless, a probable second round
with the incorporation of both Romania and Bulgaria would certainly enhance the
existing security cooperation and strengthen the security structure in both the Black
Sea and the Balkans. On the other hand, there are risks of new confrontations in the
region. The new NATO members may be tempted to exploit the Alliance to obtain
more financial or political aid from the allies and to exert pressure upon their rivals.
Turkey's alienation from European security architecture has the potential to support
such considerations, when new members and the prospective members would have
an advantageous position in taking part in European security initiatives.
Moreover, along with the enlargement of NATO's sphere of influence as to
fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Russian existence, Turkish sphere of
influence will also be enlarged as to offer an institutional like-minded platform of
states in the Black Sea and Caucasian region. Furthermore, the security produced in
the Black Sea region will be projected to Caucasus and contribute to the security of
the Caspian and Central Asian energy resources. With respect to the energy routes
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from east to west, especially the Caspian energy inroad to West, the partnership
enlargement further secures the Turkish economic and energy interests in the region.
First, because PfP existence in the region is one of the basics of the stability in the
region. Second, stability ensures the construction of the means to transport the
regional potential of oil and gas to Europe. Finally, Turkey will economically benefit
while PfP provides the continuance of resource flow to Europe.
On the other hand, with regard to the enlargement through partnership, the
process of including Euro-Asian community of states into PfP and EAPC has
encouraged the nations from the Balkans to Central Asia to further their relations
with the West. In this respect, Turkey also had its own share. Partnership
enlargement consolidated Turkey's role as a bridge between Caucasian and Central
Asian Turkish Republics, and the West. Indeed, though largely on military and
security grounds, PfP has provided Turkey with an institutional means to establish a
teaching and learning process with the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia.
Accordingly, it can be argued that establishing close evolutionary relations
with the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Central Asia enhances Turkey's own Western
identity. A model of Western Turkish identity, which is Muslim, parliamentarian,
democratic, laicist can also be projected to the partners in these regions.
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APPENDIX 1
The North Atlantic Treaty
Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are
determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on
the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and
well being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence
and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :
Article 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.
Article 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting
conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their
international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or
all of them.
Article 3
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and
jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
Article 4
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be
reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and
security (1).
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Article 6
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to
include an armed attack:
• on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian
Departments of France, (2) on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the
jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of
Cancer;
• on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these
territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the
Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the
Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.
Article 7
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights
and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or
the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace
and security.
Article 8
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and
any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and
undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.
Article 9
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to
consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so
organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such
subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence
committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.
Article 10
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to
further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic
area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by
depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America.
The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the
deposit of each such instrument of accession.
Article 11
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as
soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all
the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States
which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including
the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect
to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.
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Article 12
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if
any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having
regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including
the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the
United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 13
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one
year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States
of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each
notice of denunciation.
Article 14
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited
in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will
be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.
Notes:
1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey and by the
Protocols signed on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Spain.
2. On January 16,1963, the North Atlantic Council heard a declaration by the French
Representative who recalled that by the vote on self-determination on July 1, 1962, the
Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the independence of Algeria in co-
operation with France. In consequence, the President of the French Republic had on July 3,
1962, formally recognised the independence of Algeria. The result was that the "Algerian
departments of France" no longer existed as such, and that at the same time the fact that they
were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing. Following this
statement the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were
concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.
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APPENDIX 2
Partnership for Peace: Framework Document
Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of
the North Atlantic Council
Brussels, 10 January 1994
1. Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their
meeting on 10/11 January, 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the
other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties
and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area,
hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this
Partnership for Peace.
2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and
security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common
action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and
safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values
fundamental to the Partnership.
In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other
States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of
democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of
the principles of international law.
They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the
United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights;
specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by
peaceful means.
They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE
documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in
the field of disarmament and arms control.
3. The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation in pursuing the following objectives:
a. facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
b. ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional
considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility
of the CSCE;
d. the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of
joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to
undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian
operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; e. the development, over the
longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of
the North Atlantic Alliance.
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4. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents
identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the
military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities. NATO will propose a
programme of partnership exercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership's
objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state
will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme.
5. In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing
states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary,
relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in
Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities,
as well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets,
facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership
Programme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their
individual Partnership Programmes.
6. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:
a. those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will,
where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises;
b. they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour
otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;
c. they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate
Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of
the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement
the Partnership programmes;
d. those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain
NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;
e. building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states
and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or
are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to
ensure the democratic control of armed forces;
f. they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning
and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/
Partnership for Peace.
7. In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the
members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:
o develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a
basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made
available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in
conjunction with Alliance forces;
o promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to
provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other
subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of
doctrine.
NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a
direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.
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